Nudging voters to choose women. Evidence from Italy. by Kansikas, Carolina
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nudging voters to choose women 
Evidence from Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Carolina Kansikas 
Master’s programme in Economics 
Aalto University School of Business 
 
 
  
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
Author  ​Carolina Kansikas 
Title of thesis  ​Nudging voters to choose women. Evidence from Italy. 
Degree ​Master of Science (M.Sc.) 
Degree programme  ​Economics 
Thesis advisor  ​Manuel Bagues 
Year of approval​ ​2019 Number of pages ​  ​86 Language ​  ​English 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine the impact of a new voting system: double preference voting               
conditioned on gender. In a context of proportional representation with open lists, the             
policy allows voters to cast up to two votes, one for a female candidate and one for a male                   
candidate. This policy was first implemented in the 2013 local elections in Italy in              
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. In smaller municipalities voters may           
choose only one candidate. 
I extend Baltrunaite et al. (2017) using a regression discontinuity design to            
investigate how the policy affects the share of votes received by women. While only a               
minority of voters effectively placed two preference votes (around 28%), I find that the              
new voting policy has increased the share of female candidates in municipal councils from              
around 20%to 34% (13.4 p.p.). The policy has not significantly increased turnout of male              
or female voters, nor has it raised the quality of elected councilors measured as their years                
of education. In addition, it has not had a significant impact on the share of female                
mayors. 
If all voters used their second vote, votes for male and female candidates would be               
distributed equally: the share of votes received by female candidates would be 50%. I              
thus complement the analysis using a survey on political preferences and voting behavior             
to investigate voters’ preferences and their use of the new policy. Around half (49%) of the                
participants to the survey (N=702) were unaware of the opportunity to use two             
preference votes in elections. Of voters surveyed, 70% perceived equal representation           
in the municipal council as very important. Lack of information, and not unwillingness             
to use second votes, could then be the reason behind the moderate impact the policy has                
achieved  compared to its potential. 
Keywords  ​Electoral systems, gender, voting behavior. 
 
 
Nudging voters to choose women:
Evidence from Italy
Carolina Kansikas
February 2019
Abstract
In this thesis, I examine the impact of a new voting system: double prefer-
ence voting conditioned on gender. In a context of proportional representation
with open lists, the policy allows voters to cast up to two votes, one for a female
candidate and one for a male candidate. This policy was first implemented in
the 2013 local elections in Italy in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabi-
tants. In smaller municipalities voters may choose only one candidate.
I extend Baltrunaite et al. (2017) using a regression discontinuity design to
investigate how the policy a↵ects the share of votes received by women. While
only a minority of voters e↵ectively placed two preference votes (around 28%),
I find that the new voting policy has increased the share of female candidates
in municipal councils from around 20%to 34% (13.4 p.p.). The policy has not
significantly increased turnout of male or female voters, nor has it raised the
quality of elected councilors measured as their years of education. In addition,
it has not had a significant impact on the share of female mayors.
If all voters used their second vote, votes for male and female candidates would
be distributed equally: the share of votes received by female candidates would
be 50%. I thus complement the analysis using a survey on political preferences
and voting behavior to investigate voters’ preferences and their use of the new
policy. Around half (49%) of the participants to the survey (N=702) were un-
aware of the opportunity to use two preference votes in elections. Of voters
surveyed, 70% perceived equal representation in the municipal council as very
important. Lack of information, and not unwillingness to use second votes,
could then be the reason behind the moderate impact the policy has achieved
compared to its potential.
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1 Introduction
Women are underrepresented in political organs in Europe. For example, in Italy,
women represent 31% of parliament members and only 27% of ministers (Istat,
2017). This underrepresentation has been attributed both to self-selection of men
and women into di↵erent career paths, and to the existence of voter and party bias
(Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Ju´lio and Tavares, 2017).
The lack of women in top political positions constitutes a problem both in terms
of equality and e ciency. Firstly, from an equality perspective, women represent
around half of the population in most countries, but their political representation
is well below their share of the population: this might be an issue because women
might also have di↵erent policy preferences, which might not be e↵ectively taken
into account if they are underrepresented (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). Even
in case women do not cater to di↵erent political needs and only target the needs
of the “median voter”, therefore exhibiting similar policy preferences as men, they
might have unobserved political skills which are not exploited in case they are dis-
criminated against (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014). From an e ciency perspective,
underrepresentation is problematic if it stems from a lack of opportunity to succeed
in a political career, instead of an active choice of women to stay away from the polit-
ical path: by considering only a limited pool of candidates, competition for political
posts is hindered as all resources are not taken into account for the selection, in turn
perhaps lowering the quality of candidates elected (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012).
The most common policy instrument used to increase female political represen-
tation has been the introduction of quotas that regulate the presence of men and
women in candidate lists. In most European countries, there exist legislated gender
quotas that apply to all parties, or quotas have been adopted voluntarily by the
main parties (International IDEA and assistance, 2018). In proportional represen-
tation systems with closed lists, well-designed quotas can help to increase the share
of women elected. An example is the “zipper system” adopted in Sweden, where
female and male candidates alternate in the ballot (Besley et al., 2017). However,
quotas may be less e↵ective in open list systems where voters can choose among all
candidates (Go´recki and Kuko lowicz, 2014).
Italy introduced in 2013 an ingenious new system to increase the share of women in
municipal councils in a context of open lists with proportional representation. The
new voting system enables voters to cast up to two preferences votes, one for a male
candidate and one for a female candidate. This new system has been implemented in
local elections in municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants. In smaller munic-
ipalities the previous system remained in place: voters may cast only one preference
vote. The objective of this thesis is to better understand this system’s impact and
6
voters’ behavior within it.
Previous work by Baltrunaite et al. (2017) using data from elections held between
2013 and 2015 has shown that the new electoral system increased the share of votes
received by women from about 20% to 34%. However, it is still unclear (i) which
element of the new system explains this impact – whether it is the availability of
a second vote, or the gender restriction – and (ii) why the increase in the share of
votes received by women has not been larger. I extend analysis from Baltrunaite
et al. (2017) using data from elections held between 2016 and 2018. I find that
the new system has increased the share of elected female councilors from 20% to
circa 34% (13,4p.p), but that it has not significantly a↵ected the quality of elected
politicians, nor turnout of male or female voters or mayors. Based on the confidence
intervals of estimates, the e↵ect on quality of elected politicians is more likely to
have been slightly positive, while the impact on female mayors is more likely to have
been slightly negative. However, there is no clear discontinuity at the threshold in
these e↵ects, compromising the causal interpretation.
Under the new system, if all voters use the second available vote, votes to male
and female candidates would be distributed equally. However, the increase in num-
ber of votes per voter upon implementation of the policy suggest that only 2 out
of 10 voters use the second vote: voting theory proposes this might be related to
a strategic, expressive or rationally ignorant voting behavior, assuming voters are
aware of their opportunity to use the second vote. I therefore conduct a survey
that provides novel information on individuals’ preferences and use of this system.
Survey results confirm that the use of double preference vote has been very limited
(28% of surveyed voters used two votes), but mostly because almost half (47%) of
the participants were not aware of the presence of the policy in their municipality,
and the hypothesis linking strategic behavior to the results is thus discarded. While
there has been a slight increase in the use of preference votes for the municipali-
ties that have voted twice under the new system, this increase has been slow. At
the same time, survey results suggest that voters perceive equal representation as
important (4 on average on a scale of 5, N=702), and do not actively oppose the
policy. The unexploited potential of the policy therefore creates interesting oppor-
tunities for future research: predicting the behavior of uninformed voters based on
the behavior of informed ones suggests that informing all voters of the existence of
the policy would increase the number of preference votes used by voters from 0.8
to 1.03 votes per voter, meaning additional two out of ten voters (23%) would take
up the second vote. As a consequence, the share of votes received by women would
increase from 39% to 43%.
This paper is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the institu-
tional framework and electoral system in Italy to introduce the new voting system.
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Then, I provide a brief theoretical framework which might help understanding vot-
ing behavior from a strategic, expressive and ”rationally ignorant” perspective: this
section introduces the hypotheses that are tested in the empirical analysis part that
follows. In the empirical analysis section, I describe the data, the regression discon-
tinuity methodology, as well as the survey; presenting results from both. In the end,
I discuss these results and provide an introduction to the opportunities for future
research that they present.
2 Institutional framework
2.1 Municipal elections in Italy
Local administration in Italy is composed by three organs: the mayor, the munici-
pal council and a local executive called Giunta Comunale. Municipal elections are
used to determine the mayor and members of the municipal council, whereas the
executive committee is nominated by the mayor among members of the council.
Local elections are held in each municipality every five years. For historical rea-
sons, not all elections are held at the same time: di↵erent groups of municipalities
vote during di↵erent years. For instance, 762 municipalities held elections on 10
June 2018, 1,009 municipalities went to the polls in 2017, and so on. In total, there
are more than 8,000 municipalities in Italy.Elections are organized through an open
list system with proportional representation. The share of votes received by each
party decides the allocation of seats across parties and, within each party, candi-
dates are allocated to seats based on the number of preference votes obtained. The
number of council members elected depends mainly on the population: the smallest
municipalities (less than 3000 inhabitants) generally elect 10 municipal councilors,
while the largest can have up to 48.
Traditionally, the number of elected female candidates has been relatively low. In
2012, around 21% of municipal councilors were women. In 2017 the elected women
councilors represented 30.8% of all councilors, while only 14% of mayors were women
(Andreuccioli, 2018).
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2.2 Voting
Italian voters participating in municipal elections before 2013 could choose to place
at most one preference vote for a councilor candidate and/or vote for a list. Since
2013, voters residing in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants can cast
up to two preference votes for candidates, at the condition the candidates have a
di↵erent gender. Municipalities below the threshold have kept the old voting sys-
tem, using only a single preference vote. Double preference voting was introduced in
municipal elections for the first time in 2013, through law 215/2012. The objective
of the new system was to improve equal gender representation in municipal councils,
after other measures, including gender quotas on party lists had not delivered the
expected result in terms of candidatures of women politicians or representation in
municipal councils.
Previous to the double preference vote policy, quotas on party lists were adopted
between 1993 and 1995. These quotas had the same requirements as the quotas in-
troduced with the policy in 2013: candidates of a single gender could not represent
more than 2/3 of candidates in a certain party list. The penalty for non-compliance
with the requirement was exclusion from elections.
In 2009, the region of Campania decided to conduct a pilot the new double prefer-
ence voting system in the 2010 regional elections. The implementation of the policy
in these elections led the share of women in the regional council to double: from
7 women out of 53 councilors in 2005 to 14 women out of 60 councilors in 2010.
The estimate of use of the double preference vote in these first election was 15.2%
of voters. The success of this trial led to the extension of the policy in municipal,
regional and European elections thereafter, although the latter have more than two
candidates available for votes. 1.
2.2.1 Voting in municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants
In municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants, the voter can cast a preference
vote for one candidate at most. This means the voter can either: (a) cast a vote only
for a list of candidates, (b) cast a vote only for one candidate in a list of candidates;
(c) cast a vote for the list and one candidate. The voter selects the candidate by
writing name and surname on the ballot (Figure I). The vote for a mayor candidate
is cast by voting for a specific party.
1For a more detailed description, see Legnante et al., 2013. The estimations and data referred
to in Legnante et al. are based on data from the Istituto Cattaneo
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Figure 1: Electoral ballot in municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants.
2.2.2 Voting in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants
Municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants enable voters to cast up to two
preference votes. There are several combinations available to the voter. First, the
voter can choose only to vote for a list. Second, the voter can choose to vote for
both list and up to two candidates belonging to the same list: the voter can choose
just one candidate, or two candidates, given the candidates chosen have di↵erent
sex. In case the voter selects two candidates of the same gender, her second vote
will be discarded. Finally, the voter can still choose to cast only one preference vote.
The ballot is illustrated below in figure 2. There is no prompting on the ballot or in
the electoral cubicle concerning the electoral rule, i.e. no reminders of the correct
way of voting under the system.
Figure 2: Electoral ballot in municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants.
2.3 Administrative elections of June 2018
On Sunday, 10 June 2018, municipal elections were held in Italy. The elections
covered 760 municipalities, of which were 20 main municipalities (Capoluogo di
provincia). In total, the first round of elections covered a population of 7,706,017
inhabitants. The 2018 elections were the fourth elections since the implementation
of double preference voting.
In municipalities where a clear majority could not be achieved by any mayor can-
didate, a second round of elections to elect the mayor was held on the 24 of June,
2018. 76 municipal administrative units held a second turn of elections to elect a
10
mayor. These municipalities account for a total population of 3,301,924.
2.3.1 Use of preference votes in elections
The working of the policy depends on the extent to which people select individual
candidates in their vote. The inclination of people to use preference votes can be
calculated through the preference index score, which measures the average amount
of preference votes given by a voter in a certain municipality compared to votes
available. The index is calculated by dividing the observed number of preference
votes cast by voters (total number of votes) to the number of votes available to
voters at maximum (with double preference voting, the maximum amount is two
preference votes per voter). The higher the index measure is, the higher the number
of preference votes cast by voters is. The average preference index for a sample of
20 municipalities participating in municipal elections in 2018 was 0.44. In terms of
votes per voter on average, this means 0.8 preference votes per voter in the large
municipalities going to the polls in 2018.2
The use of preference votes has not changed significantly in elections since the imple-
mentation of the new voting policy (CISE, 2012). The policy itself had determined
an increase in preference votes, which increased voters per voter from 0.6 to around
0.8, implying around 2 out of 10 voters use the double vote, if the whole increase can
be attributed to the policy (Baltrunaite et al., 2017). What persists across years is
the regional variation in the number of preference votes used in Italy, and generally
there are more candidates running for elections in municipalities of Southern Italy.
The South of Italy presents a larger share of preference votes given to candidates
compared to Northern Italy. Besides geographical variation, voters of specific par-
ties also tend to use more preference votes compared to others. For example, voters
of left-wing parties tend to use more preference votes compared to right-wing party
voters (Rombi, 2016).
3 Literature
3.1 Why are women underrepresented in politics?
Despite a consistent e↵ort in implementation of policies to promote equal partici-
pation in politics, there are still many women missing from representative political
2The preference index data was provided by Stefano Rombi (Universita´ di Cagliari) for the subset
of the 20 main municipalities voting in 2018, therefore it represents mainly the largest municipalities
going to the polls.
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organs. From an equality perspective, this absence is problematic because by not
participating in political decision-making in first person, women are not able to ad-
vance policies which are beneficial for other women, who represent around half of
the population in most countries (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).
Even in case women do not cater to di↵erent political needs and only target the
needs of the “median voter”, therefore exhibiting similar policy preferences as men,
they might have unobserved political skills which are not exploited in case they are
discriminated against (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014). From an e ciency perspective,
under-representation is problematic if it stems from a lack of opportunity to suc-
ceed in a political career, instead of an active choice of women to stay away from the
political path: by considering only a limited pool of candidates, competition for po-
litical posts is hindered as all resources are not taken into account for the selection,
in turn perhaps lowering the quality of candidates elected (Bagues Esteve-Volart,
2012).
Four main reasons are presented in the literature as explanations of the absence
of women from the political arena: self-selection, party bias, voter bias and electoral
systems. These factors and their links to double preference voting are presented in
the following paragraphs.
3.1.1 Self-selection
As any other career choice, selection of candidates to a certain profession is influ-
enced by both opportunity costs and intrinsic motives. If a candidate expects higher
returns from other sectors of the labor market, then they will have a high oppor-
tunity cost for entering politics and may decide to steer away from it in favor of
more profitable opportunities (Dal Bo´ et al., 2017). Conversely, a candidate with
low expected returns from the private sector may find the public sector attractive.
As the returns are dictated also by personal competence, this may lead to a negative
selection of politicians (Caselli and Morelli, 2004).
Following this reasoning, women may find a political career unattractive if the op-
portunity costs are high compared to the expected returns from a political career.
If women expect higher returns from other career choices, they might choose those
career paths instead of the political career (Dal Bo´ et al., 2017). This type of candi-
date self-selection does not restrict the available pool of political talent available for
public service, as the candidates would not have chosen a public career anyway. In
turn, however, the payo↵ from a political career might be influenced by likelihood
of succeeding at it: if self-selection is a result of a decreased likelihood of success,
not dictated by competence, then it is unclear whether withdrawal can be viewed as
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self-selection or as an e ciency issue, especially in case of risk-aversive individuals.
3.1.2 Party bias
The first external reason why women might be underrepresented against their po-
tential willingness to pursue a political career is party bias. Party bias refers to
discrimination of parties towards women candidates. This discrimination can take
place either through an unfavorable placement is candidate lists (Esteve-Volart and
Bagues, 2012), or through a lack of support for female candidates inside the party,
in a belief that female candidates are less likely to win elections (Bhavnani, 2009).
Quotas have been the primary tool for the reduction of party bias in elections,
however, their e↵ectiveness might be limited if candidates are placed unfavorably
in ballots in the context of closed list systems. For example, candidates who are
placed to a higher position in the party list, regardless of whether the system is
open or closed, tend to perform better compared to candidates towards the list bot-
tom. Parties may then place female candidates strategically in party ballot, reducing
their chances to get elected in a closed list system (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012).
In the context of an open list system, party bias can work in the same direction,
if the ranking of candidates in lists still matters for the amount of votes received
(Baltrunaite et al., 2017). Furthermore, parties might not overcome their bias until
the woman wins competitive elections against male candidates without the use of
external allocation of seats, as one of the main concern for biased parties is that
women are not as e↵ective in winning elections as men (Baskaran and Hessami,
2018). For this reason, policies giving a higher likelihood to women to win elections
in the context of an open list system - such as double preference voting - may be a
useful tool to reduce party bias when simple quotas do not su ce.
3.1.3 Voter bias
Negative voter bias refers to the tendency of voters to eschew female candidates.
While party bias might still influence results in a proportional, open list system, a
bias against women candidates on behalf of voters will have a stronger impact on
their representation in this context: the open list system empowers voters to choose
candidates independently from any position of the party list, giving voters more
freedom to discriminate against their least preferred candidates.
Voter bias can be attributed both to gender norms (Profeta et al., 2018) or sta-
tistical bias, related to lack of exposure to female candidates (Baskaran and Hes-
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sami, 2018). The voter’s problem when choosing a candidate directly from a party
list is that she would like to choose the most able politician of the ones presented,
with limited information at her disposal on the ability and intrinsic motivation of
candidates (Dal Bo´ et al., 2017). While cultural bias is stickier and perhaps more
di cult to tackle on its own, avoidance of female candidates may then be a result
of a lack of female politicians in o ce: as voters do not have enough information
on the competence of women as politicians and therefore discriminate against them.
Exposure to female politicians should then contribute in removing this statistical
bias, as voters learn about the skills of women as politicians (Baltrunaite et al.,
2014).
For example, Beaman et al. (2009) study the impact of exposure to a female politi-
cian in the context of Indian villages, where female leadership of towns is allocated
by randomly assigned quota. They find the causal impact of exposure to a female
leader improves voters’ perception of women as politicians and these gains in per-
ception have spillovers that extend outside of politics. Voters’ experience of a female
leader can reduce negative bias related to ignorance about womens’ political skills.
In this context, and partially perhaps for the same reason, the election of women
as political leaders may even create positive spillover e↵ects for other female can-
didates, for example helping them get elected (Baskaran and Hessami, 2018). The
impact of exposure to female candidates arising from policy choices seems also to
be persistent, influencing electoral outcomes also after the specific policy channel
has been removed. For instance, Bhavnani (2009) studies this long-term impact of
quotas, finding that exposure to female leaders in Indian villages remains in a↵ected
areas even after the removal of the policy. Prior evidence therefore shows that a
policy successfully increasing exposure to female politicians can be useful to reduce
voter bias, and its e↵ects may be prolonged, even extending to other layers of the
political hierarchy in case female politicians are elected to leading positions.
3.1.4 Electoral systems
Voter and party bias have important interactions with the electoral system, as the
latter sets the constraints for transmission of either bias in electoral results. First,
whether a system is majoritarian or proportional a↵ects female representation. Fur-
ther, whether a proportional system is organized through open lists or closed lists
influences the share of elected women. The impact of the electoral system will then
depend on (i) the importance that the system places on individual candidates and
(ii) which type of bias is prevalent in the electorate.
In general, it has been shown that electoral systems with a stronger focus on indi-
vidual candidates are less advantageous for female candidates compared to electoral
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systems where the main focus is on the party (Thames and Williams, 2010). For
example, Profeta et al. (2018) show that in Italy, the shift to a proportional elec-
toral system in national elections led to an increase in women’s representation. The
proposed mechanism for this increase is the placement of candidates on behalf of
parties and the risk-aversiveness of female politicians: the authors show that in
proportional systems, parties are less likely to place women to highly competed po-
sitions, which in turn encourages them to run for o ce, if the underlying assumption
is that they otherwise tend to eschew high-competiton situations. In majoritarian
systems, a more direct competition and the consequent placing of candidates to
more competitive positions leads women to withdraw more easily, and to parties
not choosing female candidates by internalizing this and voter bias. The insight
from this study is similar to the one obtained from Thames and Williams (2010). In
principle, therefore, a proportional system should encourage women to run for o ce.
Within a proportional system, open lists will amplify voter bias, whereas closed
lists will strengthen party bias.Gonzalez-Eiras et al. (2018) use a regression dis-
continuity setting to show that in the context of Spanish elections, voter bias is
prevalent: votes for women are lower (2 to 3 p.p.) in open list systems, compared
to similar municipalities adopting a closed list system. In the context of Italian mu-
nicipal elections, this means the open list system will penalize women candidates, if
voter bias is present and is more widespread than party bias.
The decrease in women’s representation resulting from open list systems is not lim-
ited to voter behavior: it also a↵ects the party’s incentives, which in turn contribute
to the selection. In closed list systems, the party’s anticipation of voter bias will
lead to a penalization of women candidates in the first spots of the list (where they
expect to have elected candidates), leaving other candidates on the list irrespective
of their gender, if they have high quality. On the other hand, in an open list system,
the internalization of the bias is not limited to the first candidate, but extends to the
whole list, as the party cannot fix the order in which voters will select the candidates,
therefore, this will penalize women throughout the list (Gonzalez-Eiras et al., 2018).
The negative impact of the electoral system is further amplified in case an open
list system is implemented in a country holding more traditional gender norms. In
these countries, the voter’s prior is likely to be that women are comparatively in-
ferior politicians with respect to men (Profeta et al., 2018). This happens because
gender is one of the pieces of information most easily available to voters when they
select a candidate from a party list: if acquiring additional information beyond these
evident signals is costly compared to the benefits it promises to yield, then, voters
will collect as little cues as possible. Consequently, if the gender of the candidate
provides a negative cue to the voter on women’s competence as politicians, it will
have an even greater impact on their electoral results, since it will represent a larger
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share of the total information collected (Valdini, 2012). Moreover, in proportional
systems with open lists, ”social norms” concerning the candidates receiving more
votes and their allocation of a place as mayor di↵er: normally, in Spanish munic-
ipal elections, the candidate receiving the most votes becomes mayor, but this is
not always the case when the second-preferred candidate is a male. Sometimes in
this case the social norm is not enforced, and the second-preferred candidate is still
chosen for the position (Gonzalez-Eiras et al., 2018).
Culture will not only a↵ect outcomes through the voter channel: it can interact
with the electoral system also through the party’s strategy. Profeta et al. (2018)
highlight that cultural attitudes towards women a↵ect how the electoral system
reflects in the selection of politicians under di↵erent electoral rules. For instance,
they show that in Italy, areas where gender roles are perceived as more traditional
(Southern Italy) elect female politicians who are more skilled compared to their
male counterparts. They rationalize this result by explaining parties ”compensate”
for the choice of gender (viewed negatively by voters) through a higher quality of
the candidate in other areas, such as education.
Overall, an open electoral system will increase the chances of voter bias negatively
a↵ecting women’s electoral results, and the e↵ect will be accentuated if the coun-
try’s culture does not provide a positive prior to voters on women as politicians.
However, there is evidence that exposure to a previous administration by a female
mayor reduces both voter and party bias against women, leveling the number of
votes received by female candidates (Baskaran and Hessami, 2018; Gonzalez-Eiras
et al., 2018).
3.2 Double preference voting
Double preference voting was experimented for the first time in Italy in occasion of
the regional elections of Campania, in 2010. Thereafter, the new voting system was
formalized and extended to the national territory through law n.215/2012. 3 The
objective of the new policy was promoting equal opportunities for both female and
male councilor candidates, as well as increasing the share of women in representative
organs.
The first elections where the double preference voting system was experimented
were the municipal elections in 2013. Baltrunaite et al. (2017) study the impact of
the new voting policy using municipalities voting between 2013 and 2015 through
regression discontinuity, finding it has increased the share of women elected 18.3 per-
centage points. This increase represents a change in the composition of municipal
3Available at: http://www.gazzettau ciale.it/eli/id/2012/12/11/012G0237/sg
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councils from a 28% of women to more than 40%, practically, an increase of around
two more female council members on average per municipal council, as council size
is typically around 10-11 in municipalities at the cuto↵. Additionally, the policy
increased the votes received by women by 15% in the sample of municipalities con-
sidered by the authors.
While the double preference voting policy was implemented simultaneously with
gender quotas, the authors find that the increase in representation and votes re-
ceived by women was namely driven by the availability of a second preference vote.
In fact there are no changes in the gender representation of candidates in party lists
across the threshold, meaning the result is not driven by a change in the candi-
dates available for a vote. Moreover, the gender quotas are necessary in this type
of system to avoid concentration of votes to a few ”minority candidates”: with less
than 2/3 of candidates representing one gender, all additional second votes would
be directed to the few ”minority candidates”, whereas first votes would be dispersed
across majority candidates.
As mentioned in the previous section, electoral systems and their interaction with
bias by voters and parties a↵ect female candidates’ performance. The new voting
system addresses primarily voter bias by giving voters an opportunity to express
two votes, but restricting the use of the second vote to a candidate of a di↵erent
gender than the first. While the policy targets primarily voter bias, Baltrunaite
et al. (2017) also test for the presence of party bias, as it is still possible that par-
ties manipulate the position of candidates in the party list to strategically favor
male candidates. Baltrunaite et al. (2017) find no evidence of such manipulation,
concluding the working of the policy primarily arises from a successful targeting of
voter bias, instead of from successful addressing of party bias.
Ultimately, the hypothesis from Baltrunaite et al. (2017) is that the voting pol-
icy works by increasing opportunities of voters to choose women candidates, who
would not be chosen with a single vote. Further, they maintain that the policy has
worked because it has addressed voter bias in a way other types of policies, or sole
gender quotas, would not have done. However, it remains unclear from the impact of
the policy why the increase in representation has not been larger than 18%: if every
voter used their second preference vote, the votes received by women candidates and
male candidates should be equal. While the votes received might not reflect directly
in the composition of the council, also the impact on votes has been small compared
to results theoretically achievable through the policy: most preference votes have
not been exploited in the first place. The impact that voting behavior might have
had on these results is examined in the next section.
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3.3 Expressive, strategic and rationally ignorant voters
The voter’s decision to vote can be summarized by the voting condition pB + d
= c , as described in Coate and Conlin (2004), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and
Downs (1957), where the term p represents the probability that the voter is pivotal
and its vote influences the outcome of the election and B the utility from influenc-
ing the outcome of the election. The term p depends on the size of elections: it
is decreasing when the number of voters increase, since the probability of a single
vote being pivotal decreases with the number of voters. It will then be the case that
when p tends to zero (as in very large elections, where the number of voters tends
to infinity), the only term that will matter will be the ”expressive one” as the small
probability will remove the strategic concern of voters: if the expressive utility that
the voter gets from voting is large enough compared to the cost of voting c, then
the voter will use the second preference vote. It therefore ultimately depends on the
perceived expressive utility of the second vote, if voters will choose to employ it or
not(Coate and Conlin, 2004).
In the context of double preference voting, the theory can be applied to the de-
cision of voters to place a second preference vote or not: voters will place a second
vote if the perceived benefit d of expressing the second vote is greater than the
perceived cost c. The benefit of expressing the second vote might not be only de-
rived by expressing support for a single candidate in the double vote case: since the
vote is a vote for a candidate couple, it also includes information on the preferred
diversity level of the council, which might influence the level of expressive utility
that the voter gets from expressing this type of vote. On the other hand, the need
to pick an additional candidate increases the costs of placing the vote. In theory,
this would imply that voters whose expressive utility is higher would be more likely
to place a second preference vote, and conversely, if this expressive utility is in-
fluenced by the objective composition of the council, it could be that voters who
are more interested in a diverse composition of the council use more preference votes.
The impact of the new system therefore depends on individuals’ preferences and
on the way in which these preferences translate into votes based on the three factors
above: strategic concerns, expressive utility and cost of voting. I analyze each of
these factors separately in this section, focusing especially on the two traditional
paradigms of voting: strategic voting and expressive voting. The first paradigm
considers strategic or pivotal voting: the voter’s choice is directed by the probabil-
ity of her vote being pivotal and influencing the result of the election (Arrow, 2012).
Voters whose choice is driven by pivotality are called strategic voters.
The decision-making process of a voter with strategic concerns when selecting a
candidate for election is that of pairwise comparison between candidates who are
adjacent in the voter’s preference ranking, this voter will make tactical decisions to
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advance the chances of voters higher in her preference ranking compared to other
candidates. These decisions might imply that the voter does not choose candidates
in the order given by the preference ranking, or in the case of the double preference
voting system, they might abstain from giving a vote altogether.
For strategic voters, therefore, there are two aspects which influence the voting
decision: the expectation of the candidates who will get elected, and their individ-
ual preference ranking. Their voting decision is a function of these two components.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973) indicates that in voting con-
texts with more than two candidates, there is always a situation where at least one
voter benefits from voting tactically if the voting system is other than dictatorial.
In this case, an example where a voter could benefit from tactical voting would be
the case where a voter abstains from placing a second vote, if they expect their vote
to benefit a candidate who is lower in their preference ranking.
On the other hand, some voters may only derive some degree of utility from voting
for the candidate they prefer, instead of voting driven by the belief of influencing the
electoral outcome. Especially in large elections, the probability for a voter of becom-
ing pivotal might be small, arguably decreasing its likelihood to direct the voting
decision. This interpretation of the voting decision is called expressive voting, as the
voters derive expressive utility from the voting decision, and voters in this context
are sincere, as they reveal their preferences through their vote without aiming at af-
fecting the outcome of the election in a strategic way (Brennan and Lomasky, 1997).
In practice, voters who are expressive will vote candidates in the order implied
by their preference ranking, after having taken into account the restrictions that the
new voting system imposes - they are ”sincere”. In the context of double preference
voting, if expressing an additional vote provides them additional utility and they
have complete preferences for candidates, then a voter who is expressive, is aware of
the possibility of placing two preference votes and has at least two candidates of a
di↵erent gender in their preference ranking should always place a second preference
vote. If all voters derived expressive utility from using double preference voting,
conditional on (i) the voters knowing that the double preference voting rule exists;
and conditional on (ii) the voters having at least two candidates of a di↵erent gender
in their preference ranking, then, the double preference voting rule should achieve
an equal share of votes received by men and women in party lists. 4
With expressive voting, the voter using the double preference vote will simply choose
4This would not necessarily mean equal representation in municipal councils because the seats
are allocated based on party votes. Also, there would not be equal representation in the case where
only one woman gets all the “female” votes: paradoxically, this can create a situation where women
are less represented, since the votes accumulate only to one candidate.
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her most preferred two candidates. However, in the framework of strategic voting,
the voter has a preference ranking which she follows to get her candidates elected.
Taking a simple example, we can assume a voter expects candidate A, candidate
B and candidate C to be elected. Candidates A, B, and C are all men. The last
candidate, D, is a woman. In this case, the strategic voter will only place a second
vote if she prefers female candidate D to candidate C. If double preference voting
leads voters to choose against their preference ranking, then double preference vot-
ing acts as a nudge: restricting the choice of candidates for the second vote, the
social planner creates a system which mechanically increases the share of women in
councils (Balz et al., 2014).
Finally, the new voting system increases the complexity of elections. As acquir-
ing information on candidates is costly, voters may choose to limit the resources
they use to evaluate the candidates, or vote ideologically to limit the amount of in-
formation needed: this type of voter is called rationally ignorant (Downs, 1957). In
this context, the “rational ignorance” phenomenon described by Downs may induce
some voters not to use the second vote. In case voters are ignorant about the charac-
teristics of the candidates, they might prefer to leave the decision on whom to elect
to better informed voters. In this case, they would either vote ideologically in the
sense implied by Downs (1957), and only choose a party, or vote for only one can-
didate as they are not informed enough to choose a second candidate. Finally, the
increased amount of choices required by the new policy can induce what Augenblick
and Nicholson (2015) call choice fatigue: the increased amount of decisions required
on behalf of voters to be able to cast a complete vote with two preferences is higher,
which may lead to voters abstaining from placing a preference vote altogether when
faced with the increased complexity of the decision (therefore increasing the share
of ”only party” votes).
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4 Theoretical framework
4.1 Votes and preferences
There are two main explanations for the mechanism through which the new vot-
ing system works to increase the share of votes for women. The first explanation,
supported by Baltrunaite et al. (2017) is that the new voting system, through the
option to cast a second vote, allows voters to express their preference for diversity.
This preference for diversity is interpreted by Baltrunaite et al. (2017) in terms of
the single candidate: as voters tend to place women candidates to a lower position
in their preference ranking the new voting system favors women, as it allows voters
to choose candidates who are in a lower position of the voter’s cardinal preference
ranking.
Besides the opportunity to express a vote for a candidate who is lower on the
preference ranking of the voter, there is another aspect introduced by the dou-
ble preference voting policy, which is the ability to express preference for diversity
in the composition of the representative committee. In the double vote system, a
voter can vote for a certain composition of the council, besides the single candidates.
A vote promoting a diverse composition of the council di↵ers from the case where
the single candidate with lower cardinal placement is selected in that it relaxes the
assumption that the female candidate should be the candidate immediately follow-
ing the male candidate in the cardinal preference ranking.5
After preference for diversity, a second explanation of the working of the policy
is that this policy can nudge voters to choose women. The “nudging” mechanism is
best explained through an example. If a voter has a preference ranking such that
two candidates of the same gender (in this case, male candidates) are on the top
of the preference list, but the voting rule does not allow for voting two candidates
of the same sex, then a strategic voter should place only a single vote. However,
if the voter receives some degree of utility from casting a second vote (the voter
is expressive to some extent) then, they should always cast the second vote if the
woman candidate is better than the marginal candidate in the preference ranking.
Thus, the voter would place their second preference vote through the new system
by construction.
Next I examine the possible votes a voter can cast in a double preference voting
system and make inferences on the preference ranking they represent through back-
5It might be also that voters having a preference for diversity voted for women in the previous
system, and might continue doing so in the new system, instead of using two preferences. If this is
the reasoning of the voter, it might be that imposing the restriction even reduces votes for women
compared of what would be possible to achieve with two votes. Naturally, whether this e↵ect would
be relevant depends on the overall share of ”diversity loving” voters.
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wards induction. I use a simple framework with two set characteristics and their
variation: an exogenous ranking of candidates, and the gender of candidates. I as-
sume the voter is only concerned about these two dimensions: the position of the
candidate in the exogenous ranking, and the gender of the candidate.
In the following examples, an exogenous ranking of candidates (which could, for
instance, represent their ”quality”) is described in the top box, with the index
standing for the gender of the candidate: m for male and f for female. The quality
of the candidates determines the order through which the voter expects them to get
elected. Below the box illustrating the expected order of election I illustrate all the
possible votes of preference a voter can cast, given the expected order of election of
these three candidates and the voting rule: the voter can vote for up to two candi-
dates. Finally, the third-level of the diagram, below the possible votes, represents
the preferences of the voter for the two candidates.
I provide two examples: the first, where the gender of the first two candidates
alternates and the second where the two first candidates ranked first are of the same
gender. The possible votes and implied preference ranking are useful to understand
why a voter can choose to cast two votes or only one.
4.2 First and second candidates have di↵erent gender
Based on the information on the quality of candidates in this case, there are three
possible votes a candidate can cast: (i) one vote for the first male candidate only,
(ii) one vote for a male candidate and one vote for a female candidate – the first
and second candidates; or (iii) a vote for the female candidate only. This scenario
is illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 3: First and second candidates have di↵erent gender
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4.2.1 One vote for the first male candidate only
In the first scenario from the left, the voter only votes for one candidate: the best
candidate on the exogenous ranking, who in this example is a male candidate. Ob-
serving this type of vote can indicate one of the following options: (a) the voter
has not collected information on any other candidates; or (b) he prefers any male
candidate to female candidates but is not allowed by the voting rule to place a vote
for two male candidates.
4.2.2 Two votes
If the voter casts two votes under these assumptions, it can be inferred the voter
indeed has preferences for A and B. If this voter would have had only one vote, he
would have solely voted for the first male candidate A: the policy enables this voter
to cast a second vote, which he will cast for the female candidate, the ”next best”
candidate for this case.
4.2.3 One vote for the female candidate only
Assuming the voter knows the voting system allows two preference votes, by placing
this vote he reveals he is either (a) uninformed about other candidates (b) prefers
only female candidates. Given the voting rule and the candidates available, this
voter will only choose the female candidate B. Unfortunately, one cannot distin-
guish is it gender preference or lack of information driving the result.
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4.3 Two first best candidates are of the same gender
In this scenario, again we can observe three possible vote combinations. These
combinations are illustrated in the tree below.
Figure 4: First and second candidates have the same gender
4.3.1 One vote for the first male candidate only (A)
In the first case we observe only a vote for the first best candidate, who in this
scenario happens to be a male candidate. A voter can cast this type of vote only
in two cases: (a) when she would have chosen two candidates of the same gender,
but was not allowed by the policy; or (b) when she only knows the first candidate
or when that is the only candidate she prefers.
4.3.2 Two votes (A and C)
Second, we can observe a vote for two candidates. This scenario is central for the
understanding of the mechanism through which double preference voting works to
increase the preference votes received by women. This type of vote implies that ei-
ther the voter has a “preference for diversity” or that she is “nudged” by the system
to cast a vote for a candidate of a di↵erent gender.
(i.) “Preference for diversity”
A voter can cast a vote for A and C if he has preference for diversity: his ob-
jective is that of having a di↵erent gender mix represented, which can be inferred
from his preferences for candidates A and C. This type of vote means that the voter
is more interested in selecting two candidates of a di↵erent gender than selecting
two candidates of the same gender with more likelihood of being elected.
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(ii.) “Nudge”
Another case where one would observe a vote combination A - C would be when the
policy “nudges” the voter to express a second vote. In this case, the voter would
have preferred the candidates in the order of “quality” or election, but instead, she is
constrained by the policy. Without the constraints of the policy, to choose a second
candidate, this voter would have compared candidate B and candidate C and deter-
mined that she prefers B to C, leading to a second vote for B. However, the policy
imposes a constraint to her choice and changes the relevant pairwise comparison for
the voter: now, she can either choose to not place a second vote at all (vote only
for candidate A), or to use a second vote. In case she derives some degree of utility
from expressing an additional vote, she will place this additional vote (since some
degree of utility makes her better o↵ than no utility at all).
4.3.3 One vote for the female candidate (C)
Finally, one could observe a vote for a female candidate only. The interpretation is
slightly di↵erent than the first scenario because of the options available: in this case,
as we cannot distinguish whether the preference is dictated by not having enough
information on other candidates, or a single-minded preference for gender over the
quality of candidates.
A mapping of the votes cast and the underlying preference ranking therefore is
useful to understand why voters would cast a second vote or abstain from it. To
summarize, voters will abstain from casting a second vote either because they strictly
prefer candidates of one gender or because they are not informed about other candi-
dates. A voter will cast a second vote in three cases: first, if the two first preferred
candidates for the voter have di↵erent gender; second, if the voter strictly prefers a
diverse gender mix in the committee (“preference for a diverse gender mix”); third,
if the voter derives any utility from placing a second vote compared to placing no
second vote at all (where the policy “nudges” voters).
4.4 Why voters do not cast a second vote?
The maps presented in the previous paragraphs provide a set of possible avenues
through which the policy has increased the number of women elected, however, this
increase has been moderate compared to the potential of the policy to increase votes
received by women: if everyone used the second vote, then, the number of votes for
men and women would be equal.
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The moderate increase means not all voters used the second vote. From the maps
presented above, two reasons for this behavior emerge: rational ignorance and a
single-minded preference for candidates of a specific gender, which limits by de-
sign the amount of votes one can use. In the first case, the voter only uses one
vote because the cost of information surpasses the expressive benefit to cast an ad-
ditional vote. This e↵ect might be especially relevant if the degree of expressive
utility derived from expressing an additional vote correlates with the probability of
the candidate being elected (i.e. if the candidate ranking of the expressive voter is
influenced by the expected order of election of the candidates).
In the second case, the preferences of the voter are simply such that she only will
vote for candidates of a given gender. As two votes for candidates of the same gender
are not valid under the new system, they will be discarded and therefore only one
of the votes will pass. Knowing this, the voter will probably choose to cast a single
vote. This type of preferences can be driven, for instance, by heuristics dictating
that a certain gender has inferior political skills compared to the other (Valdini,
2012).
4.4.1 Uninformed voters
One of the assumptions on which the interpretation of the map in the previous
paragraphs relies is voters’ knowledge of the voting rule. Specifically, this assump-
tion enables interpreting single votes as either the result of lack of information on
specific candidates (the “rational ignorance” case) or as the result of a preference
for a candidate of one gender only.
However, if a voter does not know the functioning of the voting system (or ex-
ample, he does not know that two preference votes are available instead of one),
then the single votes can also be attributed to the lack of knowledge of the voting
system, besides the other options delineated before.
4.5 Order of voters’ preferences
In the theoretical model presented by Baltrunaite et al. (2017) the order of the
preferences of the voter determines the mechanism through which the policy works.
As the policy extends the choice set for voters by including an additional vote, the
policy will increase the share of female candidates if the ”second best candidate” is
a woman. The implication is that the preferences of Italian voters are characterized
by this type of preferences.
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Therefore, if we should observe that voters place more second votes for women when
their first preferred candidate is a male candidate, then this observation would sup-
port the argument that the second vote helps getting more women elected because
they generally rank lower in the individual preference rankings of voters. It would
mean the increase in share of votes from women arises from the extension of the
choice set for voters.
Conversely, a reversed order could arise from several di↵erent scenarios. First, it
could be that the voter’s first preference is a woman and the second preference is
a male, i.e. in this case the female candidate would be the best quality candidate.
Second, it could be the voter has preference for diverse representation and wants
to use the second vote to advance a diverse gender mix in the municipal council.
Third, it can be that the voter is “nudged” to choose the male candidate (a case of
what was illustrated in example ii.b). This theoretical framework will be used to
interpret the results from the electoral survey later in this paper.
5 Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis is structured in two parts. First, I study how the new policy
a↵ects the composition of municipal councils using information from all elections
held between 2013 and 2018. Following Baltrunaite et al. (2017), I use a sharp
regression discontinuity (RD) design exploiting the implementation of the policy at
the 5,000 population cuto↵. In municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants,
candidate lists must include at least one third of male and female candidates, and
there is double preference voting, whereas voters from below the cuto↵ are not sub-
jected to these requirements.
This analysis extends the previous work by Baltrunaite et al. (2017). I estimate
the impact of the policy on the share of women elected for all municipalities us-
ing the double preference voting policy for the first time (from 2013 to 2018). In
addition, I evaluate the impact of the policy on two new outcome variables: the ed-
ucational attainment of municipal council members and turnout to the elections, for
both male and female voters. The availability of information on turnout by gender
is unique to the Italian system, and thus this is the first study analyzing the impact
of a policy on male and female voters separately.
Second, I use electoral survey information to uncover the mechanism through which
the policy leads to an increase in representation of women in municipal councils.
The primary outcomes of interest are the preference ranking of candidates of poten-
tial voters and the votes cast by actual voters.
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5.1 Regression discontinuity
I use a sharp regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal impact of the
change in voting system at the 5,000 inhabitants cuto↵ following and extending the
study by Baltrunaite et al. (2017) for municipalities up to the size of 15,000. The
running variable against which the discontinuity is estimated is municipality pop-
ulation, as treatment assignment to double preference voting arises from the size
of the municipality in terms of population, a variable smoothly increasing at the
cuto↵. The outcome of interest is the coe cient of the treatment, or the coe cient
of being a municipality larger than 5000 inhabitants.
Formally, the assignment of municipalities to the policy can be described as fol-
lows:
DPV =
(
1 if pop   5000
0 if pop < 5000
Following Baltrunaite et al. (2017) and Bagues (2017), I use two tools to exam-
ine the causal impact of the new policy on the share of women elected, turnout
and quality of elected candidates. First, I use plots of the binned averages with
a quadratic polynomial fit around the threshold to graphically observe whether an
e↵ect is detectable. Then, I employ a local polynomial regression to estimate the
magnitude of the causal impact of the policy (non-parametric approach).
The local polynomial regression can be summarized as follows:
Yi = ↵+ f(xi) +  Treatment+ "i
Where xi represents the size of resident population for each municipality i in the
sample,   is the coe cient of interest, determining the e↵ect of the policy on the
outcome variable and Treatment is a dummy variable which takes on value one
when the running variable is above the cuto↵ point. f represents the functional form
of the running variable at either side of the threshold. Finally ↵ is a constant. The
bandwidth for the regression is estimated by the optimal bandwidth established by
Calonico et al. (2017) (one common MSE optimal bandwidth).
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5.2 Electoral survey
I analyze preference and vote data of Italian electors to understand their voting
behavior. Specifically, I focus on the following aspects, which are directly related to
the theoretical framework in Section 3:
(a) The first preferences of voters;
(b) The voters’ use of preference votes;
(c) The voters’ understanding of the double preference vote system.
The data used for the analysis of the share of preferences received by women under
the existing electoral rule and under an electoral rule without gender constraints
are collected through two surveys: a pre-electoral survey, administered to Italian
residents of relevant municipalities four days before the first round of elections on
June 10; and a post-electoral survey, administered after the first round of elections.
The information collected through the surveys helps understanding electors’ pref-
erence ranking of women unconstrained by the voting procedure, and therefore is
useful to gain information on voters’ ranking of female candidates compared to
male candidates. This survey, therefore, can be used to test the theory of Bal-
trunaite et al. (2017) discussed in depth in the theoretical framework, by which
voters choose women with their second preference vote.
The post-electoral survey captures the actual voting decisions, including the option
of voters not to express any preference votes for municipal councilor candidates.
Data collected from this survey sheds light on the process through which double
preference voting might have increased the share of women representatives in Ital-
ian municipal councils. Specifically, data from this survey provides information on
voters’ awareness of the electoral rule and their understanding of the electoral rule’s
implications. For this reason, it can be used to understand how well voters can
anticipate how their vote will contribute to the electoral result.
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6 Data
6.1 Electoral data
The Italian Ministry of Internal A↵airs “Eligendo” portal provides information on
electoral turnout and the number of votes obtained by each party at the municipal
level. The Italian Ministry of Internal A↵airs also provides information on the char-
acteristics of elected candidates, including their party a liation, educational level,
profession, sex and age. A unique characteristic of the Italian electoral system is
that it collects information on turnout by gender, which I employ in my analysis.I
restrict the analysis of municipalities to those having less than 15,000 inhabitants
because of the changes in the election rule for major municipalities explained in
section I.
The descriptive statistics of the electoral data employed, for all years since 2010
are represented in the table below. These contain The share of elected women coun-
cilors in the municipalities covered by the dataset is represented below. A change
in the average share of female municipal councilors can be already observed from
simple averages, a first indication of the potential presence of a discontinuity at the
threshold due to the policy, lest there are confounding policies or manipulation.
The turnout for municipal elections seems to be relatively high, with 64% of electors
participating in voting. The turnout is slightly higher, on average, for men com-
pared to women. The availability of turnout by gender is a unique characteristic of
this dataset, as other countries do not usually divide turnout by gender of voters.
Table 3 illustrates the di↵erence between the share of elected women in municipal-
ities with more and less than 5,000 inhabitants. The shares are averages for years
2008-2012 and years 2013-2018. Before the implementation of the policy, small mu-
nicipalities had on average 18 % of female councilors in the municipal council, while
after the implementation they had 38%. Large municipalities increased the share of
female councilors from 22 % to 29%. Small municipalities are municipalities with
less than 5,000 inhabitants, those with more are categorized as large.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Share of elected women
Year Mean share (%) N. Municipalities
2008 15.41 597
2009 22.33 4208
2010 21.71 1042
2011 20.36 1294
2012 20.18 994
2013 29.65 706
2014 32.04 4039
2015 31.27 1039
2016 31.95 1346
2017 34.08 961
2018 33.02 551
Source: Italian Ministry for Internal A↵airs.
Table 2: Electoral data 2008-2018
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 16,775 7392. 43578 30 2617175
Turnout 2,064 .64 .11 .19 .94
Turnout women 2,064 .64 .11 .17 .95
Turnout men 2,064 .65 .11 .20 .96
Share of women 16,777 .27 .14 0 1
Years of education 16,728 13 2 5 18
Table 3: Type of municipality
Mean share (%) Before 2012 After 2012
Large 22 29
Small 18 38
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6.2 Preferences data
The Ministry does not collect information on the number of preference votes ob-
tained by each candidate. I construct a new dataset of preference votes received by
male and female candidates using municipality websites and other internet sources.
The dataset contains, for each list and candidate, the individual number of prefer-
ence votes received. This information is only available for a subset of municipalities
voting in 2018 (N=15). Information on preference votes received by candidates in
these municipalities is collected from several internet sources; mostly from munici-
pality websites.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics: share of votes for women
Municipality Candidates Share of votes for women
Acireale 144 .37
Afragola 197 .35
Bisceglie 292 .32
Brescia 230 .36
Brindisi 194 .34
Bussolengo 69 .34
Castellamare di Stabia 220 .40
Catania 258 .35
Cinisello Balsamo 117 .33
Conversano 150 .40
Fiumicino 244 .38
Formia 144 .37
Imola 123 .32
Imperia 222 .38
Ivrea 84 .41
Number of municipalities 15
In addition to this dataset of preference votes for 15 municipalities in 2018, I also
use a database of preference votes and preference indices for a set of main munic-
ipalities voting in 2018 and 2017. While the former dataset provides information
on the individual votes received by women, the preference vote index database pro-
vides information on the overall use of preference votes. The dataset is obtained
from Stefano Rombi (University of Catania). The dataset contains information on
the total number of preference votes used, sorted by municipality and party; as well
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as the total number of preference votes that voters, theoretically, would be able to
express. In the case of double preference voting, each voter has 2 maximum votes,
therefore, the preference index is calculated by scaling the recorded number of pref-
erence votes to the number of recorded voters in the municipality multiplied by two.
If everyone used two votes in a certain municipality, the preference index would be
1. The average preference index for the municipalities recorded in 2018 is 0.4, sug-
gesting that a large share of the population does not use preference votes or double
preference voting. From the observation of the index only, once cannot deduct the
share of the population using the double preference vote as single preference votes
are also counted. This index data is therefore used complementarily with the sur-
vey data, which instead reveals whether voters use single or double preferences to
cast their votes. The maximum number of preference votes is recorded in Southern
Italy (Campania, Avellino), consistent with previous studies on the use of preference
votes, which demonstrate that the preference index is higher in this region. (CISE,
2012).
33
Table 5: Use of preference votes
Region Municipality Inhabitants Preference index
Sicilia Catania 311 712 0,48
Sicilia Messina 234 293 0,55
Lombardia Brescia 196 745 0,24
Sicilia Siracusa 121 605 0,55
Veneto Vicenza 111 620 0,31
Umbria Terni 111 189 0,29
Marche Ancona 100 924 0,30
Puglia Barletta 94 477 0,53
Toscana Pisa 90 408 0,29
Puglia Brindisi 87 141 0,54
Veneto Treviso 84 954 0,28
Sicilia Ragusa 74 251 0,53
Sicilia Trapani 69 241 0,55
Lazio Viterbo 67 804 0,47
Campania Avellino 54 515 0,59
Abruzzo Teramo 54 338 0,56
Toscana Siena 53 901 0,33
Liguria Imperia 42 328 0,47
Lombardia Sondrio 21 558 0,47
Mean 104 369 0,44
Std. Dev. 71297 0,12
Min 21 558 0,24
Max 311 712 0,59
6.3 Candidate data
I hand-collect a dataset of 24,858 municipal councilor candidates for municipalities
where elections are held on the 10th of June 2018. Councilors are collected in the
dataset with names and surnames, and gender information on the candidates is
associated by name to each candidate. The candidate dataset includes candidates
from 17 regions and 98 municipalities where elections are held. The municipalities
contained in the candidate database cover 52.96% of the total population voting in
the 10th of June municipal elections.
10,599 (or 42.63%) of the councilor candidates in the candidate dataset are women.
According to the electoral law, the gender ratio of candidates has to be 1 to 3 at
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most. The 262 municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants represent 85.37% of
the municipalities participating in municipal elections on the 10th of June 2018 by
population.
The majority of municipalities covered by the database also have more than 5,000
inhabitants: only 11 municipalities covered in the sample have less than 5,000 in-
habitants. Therefore, the candidate database collected covers mostly larger munic-
ipalities that use double preference voting.
Candidate information was collected during the three weeks previous to the first
round of elections: the deadline to submit the candidate names to the municipal-
ity for registration occurs a month before the election date, and o cial candidate
names are made available after this deadline. Candidate information was retrieved
from municipality websites (dedicated elections sections and o cial archives), local
newspapers and party or list websites.
The gender of candidates was allocated to municipal councilor candidates manu-
ally upon collection of the candidate lists. I collected a list of first names divided
by males and females from internet sources, which I matched with the names of the
candidate information. The first name of the candidate determined the allocation
of names to one gender or the other. The remaining candidates, whose names were
not present in the list were manually matched to their gender. This procedure may
have produced some errors in allocation of candidates to one gender or the other,
if the name of the candidate is a commonly associated to one sex but in a specific
case it identifies a candidate of the opposite gender. However, names in Italy are
strongly gender-specific and therefore it is unlikely for this to have happened. For
instance, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) and Gonzalez-Eiras et al. (2018) use the
same approach.
6.3.1 Limitations of the datasets
Municipal councillor candidate information is not collected in Italy to a centralized
database. Furthermore, sometimes municipalities do not publish detailed candidate
information on their websites before elections, either. For this reason, some candi-
date information had to be collected from local newspapers in the dedicated election
section. The lack of centralized information led to some heterogeneity in the data
collected, which could not completely be eliminated when processing candidate in-
formation post collection. This may have led to some errors in completion of the
survey on behalf of participants.
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6.4 Electoral survey data
Data on voters’ preferences for male and female candidates, their order, their per-
ception of the voting system are not available from external data sources. Thus, I
organized two surveys during the 10 June 2018 elections in Italy: one pre-electoral
survey to assess the preferences for candidates before the vote and one post-electoral
survey to assess actual use of votes, the understanding of the voting system, as well
as its perception on behalf of voter. The surveys were organized through an Italian
electoral survey company, Demetra s.r.l.6 The survey was exclusively administered
to panelists who were residing in the municipalities of elections.
In total, 1,233 electors participated to the pre-electoral trial. Of these, 720 voted
and were successfully contacted again to participate to the post-electoral survey.
All data collected is anonymous. The profile characteristics of participants to the
electoral surveys are described below and compared to the respective average values
for the Italian population. There are slightly more women in the sample of partici-
pants to the survey compared to the gender ratio in Italy. The participants are also
slightly younger than the general population and their self-reported income is lower
than the average.
Table 6: Survey respondents and Italian averages
Characteristic Sample Italy
Women (%) 56.11 48.5
Average age 41.6 44.9
College education (%) 37.69 17.55
Self-employment rate (%) 7.15 23.2
Income 12,000 - 28,000 31706
Unemployment rate (%) 10.29 11.2
The survey covered the following topics:
• The ordered candidate preferences pre-vote, by candidate gender;
• The vote expressed, by gender of candidate
• The understanding of the voting system
• Perception of the voting system in the areas of equity, e ciency and ”freedom
of choice”.
6The company has a panel of around 10.000 personally recruited participants, and has access to
other panels’ participants as well.
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The detailed description of all survey questions is provided in the Appendix, at the
section ”Electoral Surveys”. The questions relative to the preference order of candi-
dates and personal knowledge of candidates were collected before elections. Previous
to the elections, also an initial statement of the intention to vote was collected. Vot-
ers that did not end up voting were not able to participate to the post-electoral
survey and were discarded through a qualifying question at its beginning.
The information collected through the electoral survey concerns survey partici-
pants residing in 98 municipalities for which candidate data was available. Most
participants to the survey were residents in municipalities with 30,000 to 100,000
inhabitants (47.28%). The most represented regions were Lazio and Sicilia (48% of
participants).
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7 Results
7.1 Impact of the policy
7.1.1 Share of women elected
Results from estimation of the impact of the policy are presented in Table 8. The
policy increases the share of elected women in municipal councils by 13.4 percentage
points in municipalities adopting the policy, compared to municipalities just below
the threshold not implementing double preference voting. This means on average,
slightly more than one woman enters the council as a consequence of the policy at
the 5000 municipality threshold, where the council size is usually of 11 members.
This change represents an increase from an average of 30 % to an average of 43%
for municipalities adopting the policy compared to the ones just below the 5,000
population cuto↵. The RD plot for share of female councilors elected is at Figure
5, additional graphs are located in the Appendix (section: Regression Discontinuity
Plots).
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Figure 5: Share of women in councils post-reform
Notes: The graph shows the binned mean shares of women councilors plotted against the
forcing variable (population size). The straight line represents the 5,000 inhabitants thresh-
old. The fit of the polynomial is quadratic.
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Table 7: Share of women in municipal councils & education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women before Education before Women after Education After
Treatment -0.007 0.121 0.129 0.260
(0.013) (0.172) (0.016) (0.175)
Bias corrected -0.006 0.15 0.134 0.260
(0.013) (0.172) (0.016) (0.175)
Robust SE -0.006 0.15 0.134 0.260
(0.016) (0.20) (0.016) (0.21)
Bandwidth 1975 1425 1073 1623
Observations 7457 7454 7836 7794
Obs. on the right 1617 479 399 558
Obs. on the left 1168 739 561 919
Notes:The table reports results from non-parametric estimation of the treatment e↵ect around the 5,000 population
cuto↵. The dependent variables in the table are the share of female councilors and the years of education completed
by the council members. The results concern municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants. The table contains
conventional RD estimates, bias corrected estimates and estimates computed with robust standard errors. The
bandwidth is selected by the one common-MSE optimal bandwidth selector by Calonico et. al.2017.
7.1.2 Educational attainment of elected councilors
One of the hypotheses to be tested was whether the new voting system increases the
quality of elected politicians. For instance, Bagues (2017) find that in Spain, quotas
alone had no impact on the quality of candidates measured through education, using
the same methodology. In this case, where quotas are combined with the double
preference policy, it also appears there is no significant impact on the average edu-
cational attainment of councilors, measured in years of education completed. The
point estimate of the coe cient is 0.260 and the result is not statistically significant
with a standard error of 0.175 (Table 8). The e↵ect is more likely to have been
positive based on the confidence interval of the estimate, but there is no clear dis-
continuity at the threshold, therefore no causal inference can be drawn.
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7.1.3 Turnout
The new policy could also impact citizens’ willingness to vote. An increase or de-
crease in turnout as a result of the policy could have several interpretations: for
instance, a decrease in turnout in treated municipalities could be a sign of selection.
On the other hand, an increase in turnout in treated municipalities would mean the
policy a↵ects the willingness of voters to go to the polls, either because the extended
opportunities of casting a vote or to protest against the new system.
The voting system does not seem to have an impact on the overall electoral turnout:
there is no change is the amount of electors deciding to vote as a result of the im-
plementation of the policy in municipalities above the 5,000 inhabitants threshold.
The policy does not impact turnout for women or male voters, either (columns 2
and 3): the turnout of women or men does not increase. The gender ratio of voters
does not change as a result of the policy, meaning the relative amount of men to
women going to the polls does not change either, besides their absolute numbers.
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Figure 6: Impact of the policy on electoral turnout
Notes: The graphs shows the binned mean shares of women councilors plotted against
the forcing variable (population size). The straight line represents the 5,000 inhabitants
threshold. The fit of the polynomial is quadratic (black line).
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Table 8: Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout Turnout women Turnout men Gender ratio
Treatment -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 0.012
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009)
Observations 1799 1799 1799 1799
Notes: The table reports the estimated e↵ect of the treatment on turnout in 2017 divided by
gender. Turnout is estimated as the share of voters compared to the population of electors
residing in a municipality. The gender ratio is the share of men to women. A higher gender
ratio indicates a larger share of women voting.
7.1.4 Share of female mayors
I expand the analysis to examine whether the new voting system also a↵ects the
choice of a mayor. As mentioned in Section 1, the choice of a mayor is not subjected
directly to the double preference voting system, although women could benefit from
the expectation of having a larger share of women elected with them (Baskaran and
Hessami, 2018).
The policy does not a↵ect the share of female mayors in a statistically or econom-
ically significant way: the coe cients for the treatment are very small, in addition
to their imprecision. This finding is similar to that of Bagues (2017), who finds no
impact of quotas on the share of female mayors. Neither quotas associated to double
preference voting seem to have an impact on this outcome.
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Figure 7: Female mayors
Notes: The graphs shows the binned mean shares of women mayors plotted against the forc-
ing variable (population size). The straight line represents the 5,000 inhabitants threshold.
The fit of the polynomial is quadratic.
Table 9: Female mayors
female mayors before female mayors after
Treatment 0.050 -0.075
(0.036) (0.040)
Bandwidth 1654 1575
Observations 7443 7825
Obs. to the right 542 549
Obs. to the left 890 881
Notes: The table reports the estimated e↵ect of the treatment on share of female mayors
for elections between 2013 and 2018 (after) and before 2013 (before). Standard errors for
the estimated coe cients in parentheses.
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7.2 Validity of the empirical strategy
7.2.1 Manipulation
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that treatment assignment can-
not be manipulated: assuming assignment to treatment cannot be manipulated
through the forcing variable on behalf of voters or municipalities, the allocation of
municipalities to treatment should be as good as random. Selection of municipalities
to one side of the threshold or the other can be detected by observing the distribu-
tion of the running variable at the 5000 population cuto↵. Checking for covariate
balance should ensure there are no significant di↵erences in municipalities across the
cuto↵.
I use a McCrary test to graphically inspect the density plot of the population vari-
able around the threshold to test the assumption McCrary (2008) (Figure 7). The
distribution of the running variable does not show signs of manipulation across the
threshold: there are no peaks in the vicinity of the 5,000 population cuto↵. I il-
lustrate the density function in Figure 5. Since the population variable does not
present any peaks around the cuto↵, I conclude there is no indication of selection of
municipalities to either side of the threshold.
7.2.2 Confounding policies
Identification of the e↵ect of double preference voting relies on the assumption no
other policies are at play at the threshold. There are no other policies implemented
at the 5000 population cuto↵ after the implementation of double preference voting.
A potential impact from the change in remuneration of mayors is inspected in Bal-
trunaite et al. (2017), with no finding of an e↵ect when the remuneration policy is
implemented. Furthermore, the mayor remuneration policy which takes place con-
currently at the 5000 inhabitants threshold was implemented before the policy. Its
e↵ects are inspected by checking for changes in share of women politicians, quality
of politicians and quantity of women mayors at the threshold.
The remuneration policy could impact the observed outcomes in several ways, all
of them reliant on the assumption that mayors and/or councilors react to financial
incentives. First, the remuneration policy could raise the quality of elected politi-
cians, if it causes the competition for spots in the municipal council to increase.
Second, the policy could increase the share of female mayors if some women, pre-
viously attracted by a higher retribution in the private sector or industry are now
opting for a political career. The impact of the remuneration policy can be tested
by performing placebo tests at the 5000 inhabitants cuto↵ before the actual double
preference voting policy is implemented (before 2013).
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Figure 8: McCrary manipulation test
Notes: The graph plots the density of the running variable around the threshold of 5000
inhabitants. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.
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If there are confounding factors at play at the 5,000 population threshold other
than the implementation of the new policy, then the e↵ect captured by the regres-
sion discontinuity would be present even before the implementation of the policy.
To ensure the policy does not impact the outcome variables of interest, besides ex-
amining the impact of the policy after its actual implementation, I also examine
whether an impact is detectable at the threshold before the implementation of the
policy during years before 2012. The results are reported in Table 2. There is no
detectable impact of the policy before the policy has taken place.
7.3 Discontinuities in di↵erences
An alternative method of estimating the impact of the policy is to estimate its e↵ect
based on changes in shares of women, education and female mayors, to see whether
the policy has impacted the rates of change in these variables over time. For exam-
ple, Bagues (2017) use this method to inspect the impact of quotas on party lists
on similar indicators (share of women and quality of politicians). The di↵erences
approach di↵ers from the linear one as it can capture the impact on rate of changes
in these variables, therefore capturing changes in the variables observed over time
which might not be noticed from the linear estimation. Results from this estimation
are reported in Table 11.
The coe cient relative to changes in share of women elected is similar to the one
estimated through the traditional linear method, and it would indicate a causal
change in share of women elected of 13.8 %. Again, this e↵ect is highly significant:
the smallest e↵ect caused by the policy would be 9%, while the largest 18% based on
the 95% confidence interval. The e↵ect of the policy on years of education is smaller
than the one presented by traditional estimation and would indicate an e↵ect of 9%,
and still not significant. Finally, the impact on the change in share of mayors is
insignificant in this case, too (coe cient: -0.03, SE: 0.04).
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  share of women   education   female mayors
RD estimate 0.139 0.091 -.039
(0.021) (0.154) (0.044)
N 6975 6943 6997
Table 10: Results from regression discontinuity estimation on di↵erences
Notes: The table shows results from regression discontinuity estimation on dif-
ferences between shares of women elected, elected mayors and education levels of
councilors, measured in years. The change in variables is calculated for each year
available for years 2013-2018 as  = share(t2) - share(t1)
7.3.1 Impact after multiple elections
I compare the estimated impact of the policy on the municipalities that voted twice
using the new system to understand whether voters might have started to use more
second preference votes the second time they had the opportunity to use second
preference votes. It appears from regression discontinuity results that the impact of
the policy in the municipalities under analysis (N=591) seems to have been lower
because of an increase in female councilors elected in municipalities below the 5000
population threshold. In 2013 elections, the average share of female councilors in
municipalities below 5000 inhabitants was 27% , whereas in 2018 it was 30%; compa-
rably the share for municipalities above 5000 inhabitants was on average 34% in 2013
and 39% in 2018, but there is no clear discontinuity when taking into account only
municipalities from 2018. The gain in women’s representation above the population
threshold seems therefore stable and even increasing (from 34% in 2013 to 39% in
2018). The estimated impact from the regression discontinuity changes mostly be-
cause women’s representation in municipalities below the 5000 population threshold
has also increased and seems to be closer to the average share of women in larger
municipalities than before. Potentially, this could indicate a ”spillover e↵ect” of the
policy in terms of awareness towards issues of equal representation to municipalities
not a↵ected by the policy, but close in size to the ones a↵ected. However, the latter
hypothesis is only speculative and cannot be tested in this setting as there might be
other factors influencing the increase in representation below the threshold.
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Figure 9: Impact of the policy on di↵erences in shares of women elected
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Figure 10: Impact of the policy on di↵erences in education
Figure 11: Impact of the policy on di↵erences in shares of elected female mayors
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Figure 12: Impact of the policy after multiple elections
Notes: The graph shows the plot of the estimated impact of the policy in munici-
palities that voted twice with the policy, in 2013 and 2018 for municipalities until
15,000 inhabitants. There are 591 such municipalities.
Share women 2013 Share women 2018
RD Estimate 0.130 0.087
(0.061) (0.053)
Obs. to the left 403 406
Obs to the right 194 185
N 597 591
Table 11: Share of women with multiple elections
Notes: The table presents results from regression discontinuity for municipalities
voting in 2013 and 2018. These are the same municipalities observed in two di↵erent
elections. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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7.4 Mechanism of the policy
7.4.1 Voters’ information on candidates
Voters participating to both surveys were asked to anticipate whether they would (i)
vote or not and (ii) how informed they were about candidates running for election
in their municipality during the pre-electoral survey. Of the voters who participated
in the second electoral survey (and therefore, stated they actually voted during the
10th June elections) the majority indicated they would be voting in elections (96%).
14 stated they would not vote and 14 stated they were not sure they would vote.
The mean of the answers on level of information (on a scale from 1 to 5) was 3.7
with a standard deviation of 1.108. Of the voters who stated they would vote, only
12% indicated that they were informed less than a level of 3 on a scale of 5. These
indicators provide an initial context for the interpretation of survey results, and are
presented in Table 12.
Voting intention Scale
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Yes 26 55 169 226 198 674
No 5 3 3 1 2 14
I don’t know 1 4 5 2 2 14
Total 32 62 177 229 202 702
Table 12: Voting intention and information
Notes: The table presents results from the pre-electoral survey (N=1233). The ”Voting intention column”
represents the intention to vote, whereas the ”Scale” column represents the level of information the voter
perceives he has about canddidates running for election.
7.4.2 Understanding and use of the system
Nearly half (47%) of all participants to the post-vote survey (N=720) were not aware
of the availability of two preference votes in the 10 June 2018 elections and stated
only one vote was available to them. As all participants to the survey were drafted
from municipalities of at least 10,000 inhabitants where the new voting system was
implemented, this result displays a significant lack of knowledge of the functioning
of the voting system, which may be the reason why the increase in preference votes
used has been moderate compared to its potential.
Consistently, half of the participants stated they did only place one preference vote.
28% of participants declared they placed two preference votes, and 22% voted only
for a party list, thereby not placing any preference vote. There is no statistically or
economically significant di↵erence in the use of preference votes for male and female
participants of the survey: regressing being female on the number of preference votes
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used yields a coe cient of -0.021 with a standard error of 0.053, which is indistin-
guishable from zero. This means female voters did not take up the policy better
than their male counterparts, suggesting the lack of knowledge was independent of
the interest of any specific group.
A higher level of education of the voter did not a↵ect the number of preference
votes used, either: regressing a binary variable reflecting college attendance on the
number of preference votes did not yield any economically significant di↵erence,
besides the variable being very imprecise (coe cient: 0.012, SE: 0.932). Again,
this finding points towards a generalized lack of information, independent of socio-
demographic characteristics.
Participants’ ability to anticipate which types of votes would be deemed valid in
the scrutiny was also tested through an exercise, where users were presented with
three ballot pictures, each of them containing a potential vote. The exercise asked
participants to determine which ballot would be interpreted as valid in the vote
count, and multiple choices were available. Only a fraction of participants were able
to distinguish the right answer from the questionnaire (Figure 7). The most com-
mon mistake was misinterpretation of the disjoint vote, where the voter can express
votes for lists and candidates separately.
Known preferences
Used 0 1 2 3 Total
0 21 101 70 3 195
1 1 219 129 5 354
2 0 8 144 1 153
Total 22 328 343 9 702
Table 13: Understanding and use of the voting system
Notes: The table presents, on the Y-axis, the votes that the voters used,
and in the X-axis the number of preferences that the voter was aware
she had the opportunity to use in the election. Data is from the post-
electoral survey (N=702)
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7.4.3 Use of double preference voting
To understand the use of double preference voting, I examine the use of preference
votes in two groups participating to the post-electoral survey: users of the single
preference vote and users of the double preference vote. Under the assumption of
expressive voting (voters are sincere) we can interpret information as a reflection of
male and female candidates’ position in voters’ preference ranking. Therefore, in-
formation on first-choice candidates and their impact on the decision to cast a single
vote or a double preference vote can be used to gain information on the mechanism
of the policy, as described in the theoretical framework section.
Coherently with the imposition of quotas on candidate lists, the share of female
and male councilor candidates was almost even in the dataset employed for the sur-
vey. Therefore, uneven candidate lists should have not impacted the results. The
descriptive results concern the use of double preference voting for those respondents
who cast two preference votes (28% of total respondents to the post-electoral sur-
vey) and the use of the single vote on behalf of those who did not use the second
preference (50% of voters in the survey).
I find that those voters who cast only one preference vote tend to prefer male
candidates over female candidates. This tendency is represented by a larger share
of votes received by male candidates in this group, at 71%. For those casting two
preference votes, the gender of the second candidate will depend on the gender of
the first candidate and each voter will cast one vote for a male candidate and one
vote for a female candidate by the construction of the policy.
When the voter has decided to place two preference votes, female candidates end
up being the first-preferred candidates 45% of the time. This means the share of
first-choice female candidates is higher for the survey participants who decided to
cast two preference votes instead of one preference vote only.
Regressing the number of votes on the first-choice candidate being female shows
voters who have a first-choice female candidate are more likely to place more prefer-
ence votes. The coe cient of the first-choice female candidate term is positive and
statistically significant, increasing by 0.139 the number of preferences votes cast, on
average (SE=0.044). Also being a voter from Southern Italy seems to impact pos-
itively the number of preference votes given: this is in line with previous evidence
on voting behavior in di↵erent geographical areas in Italy, with Southern Italian
candidates receiving more preference votes.
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Table 14: First-choice candidate with and without DPV
Female Male Total
Single vote 29% 71% 100%
Double vote 45% 55% 100%
N 702
Notes: The table presents the share of ”first” preference votes received
by male and female candidates for voters participating in the survey who
used one vote or two votes.
7.4.4 Perception of the voting system
Survey participants who were successfully recontacted after the vote were asked to
assess the system from both e ciency and equality perspectives. First, voters were
asked whether they believed the system was e cient in empowering women in pol-
itics. Second, they were asked to evaluate how important equal representation of
genders in the municipal council was for them. Third, they were asked whether they
believed the system was influential despite not a↵ecting the choice of the mayor. Fi-
nally, they had to evaluate whether, in their opinion, the new system limited their
freedom of choice.7 The perceptions of the voters were collected through a Likert
scale of 1 to 5, where the highest score 5 means they fully agreed with the statement
proposed.
Results on voter perceptions are reported below. Most voters strongly agreed on
the statement of gender equality and they also agreed with double preference voting
being an e cient system to empower women, although to a lesser extent. They
were almost indi↵erent on average on the influence of the policy on the choice of
mayor. Finally, voters were, on average, in slight disagreement with the statement
that double preference voting limits their freedom of choice.
7A translation of the statement used for e ciency is: ”Double preference voting is an e cient
tool in empowering women in politics”. The respective quote for equality was: ”It is important to
have equal representation in municipal councils”. On the allocation of benefits of the system, the
statement was: ”Double preference voting is not an e cient tool to empower women in politics,
because it does not a↵ect the choice of a mayor”. Finally, the freedom of choice statement was:
”Double preference voting limits the freedom of choice of voters”.
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As many voters state they perceive equality as an important issue through their
answers, next I test whether the positive attitude towards equal political represen-
tation is reflected in voting behavior by regressing the equality score on the number
of preferences cast. A more positive evaluation of the equality statement seemed
to have a positive impact on the number of votes given: an increase in the Likert
scale of 1 point yields an increase in number of preference votes given of 0.079 (SE:
.022), which implies being more in agreement with the equality statement seems to
be associated to an increase in preference votes given (an increase of 1 point on the
Likert scale increases the preference votes given by 0.079).
Table 15: Perception of the voting system
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Equality 4.00 1.216 1 5
E ciency 3.38 1.333 1 5
No mayor 3.12 1.315 1 5
Freedom 2.86 1.365 1 5
N 702
Notes: The table presents the mean and standard deviations for the
indicators of perception of the voting system. ”Equality” refers to the
importance that survey participants placed on equal representation, ”Ef-
ficiency” refers to how e cient they perceived the voting system to be,
”No mayor” refers to a question where voters were asked if the policy
was ine cient because it did not a↵ect the mayor. Finally ”Freedom”
indicates whether voters thought the new voting system limits their free-
dom of choice in the selection of council participants. Data is from the
post-electoral survey (N=702)
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Table 16: Perception of the voting system
Outcome: N. of Preference Votes
Variable (1) (2) (3)
equality 0.079 0.087 0.079
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
female -0.073 -0.068
(0.054) (0.057)
college 0.0293
(0.52)
constant 0.623 0.634 0.648
(0.09) (0.09) (0.099)
N 702 702 657
R2 0.019 0.021 0.017
Adj. R2 0.017 0.018 0.013
Notes: the table reports results from estimation of coe cient by
OLS. The outcome variable represents the number of preference
votes given (up to two), equality is a variable which takes the value
of the Likert scale score (1-5) for the question concerning equal
gender representation. The variable female takes value 1 if the
voter is female, college is a dummy variable for higher education
of the voter. Standard errors in parentheses.
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8 Uninformed voters and electoral results
The electoral survey revealed that a large number of voters are not aware of the
existence of the new policy (47%). It is possible that this ignorance on behalf of
voters is only temporary and, with time, voters gain access to an appropriate level
of information on the electoral system. For example, if the lack of information on
the working of the policy is a result of parties’ strategies (and specifically, incum-
bent candidates reaction to increased competition) then, over time, ignorance on
the policy should decrease as the voters are able to gain the needed information
independently.
Understanding the increase in the use of the double preference vote between the
first and second election would require data on preference indices or votes per voter
from both 2013 and 2018. However, this information is available only partially.
I therefore first compare the preference indices over time based on the aggregate
information available for years 2012 and 2017 with the estimation provided by the
survey. The assumption against which this comparison relies is that the use of single
preference votes was similar before the introduction of the policy in municipalities
voting in 2012 and 2017, and that furthermore the share of single votes cast in these
municipalities is similar to the share of single votes cast in municipalities voting in
2018. In theory, if voters became increasingly aware of the availability of the second
vote o↵ered to them, the amount of votes received by women should increase in
the municipalities that have voted twice. Increased awareness could influence the
share of elected women positively, further increasing the share of female municipal
councilors in municipalities adopting the policy. The condition for this outcome is
that the increased amount of votes for women should not be directed at the same
women candidates, or the result could even be a decrease in women’s representa-
tion. At the same time, an increase in use of the double preference votes in di↵erent
municipalities over time would indicate that awareness concerning the availability
of the policy is increasing and previously uninformed voters are now able to employ
the policy.
8.0.1 Evolution in the use of preference votes
Preference votes are not recorded separately in instances where the single elector
uses both preference votes or just one preference vote. However, it is possible to
estimate, approximately, the use of double preference votes in a certain municipality
assuming that the rate of preference votes for single candidates is fixed over time
in said municipality. Keeping the rate of single preferences fixed will imply that
any additional increases in the index of preference will be attributable to the double
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preference vote.8
Based on the information provided in Legnante et al., 63% of voters used the single
preference vote on average in municipalities of the 2013 cohort, compared to 37%
who did not use any preference votes. Keeping the share of single preference votes
constant, one can calculate the rate of second preference votes. Having the sec-
ond preference vote means that any vote index calculated with one maximum vote
should be multiplied by two to obtain the real number of votes per person. In turn,
to obtain the share of voters who have started taking up the double preference I
subtract the number of votes per voter in the latter period from the number of votes
per voter in the previous one.
Detailed information on the pre-reform preference index is available for munici-
palities voting in 2012 and 2017. Therefore, I can compare the use of preference
votes in these municipalities with the assumption that the rate of single preference
votes has remained relatively stable in these municipalities. The preference index
results concern main municipalities, as opposed to results from the regression dis-
continuity which concern small municipalities. In these municipalities, the increase
in the preference index supposedly caused by the double preference voting policy
was 0.13 (0.08 is the median of the increment in preference votes per voter), which
is 0.26 votes per voter. This would in turn mean that 26% of voters used two pref-
erences. Comparing this result with the estimation from the electoral survey (28%
of voters using the second preference vote) indicates that the share of voters using
the second preference vote might not have changed greatly from one election to the
other. The comparison is valid only if the set of municipalities are comparable in
their use of votes before the policy and after it. Table 18 displays the preference
indices for municipalities in 2017 and 2012.
8This method was created by the Istituto Cattaneo CISE and has been used in several practical
studies of the use of the double preference vote, among others ”Legnante, Pulvirenti, Ru no,
4/12/2013, Doppia preferenza”.
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Municipality 2017 2012 (no DPV) Double Preference Rate
Alessandria 0,64 0,61 0,02
Asti 0,7 0,64 0,06
Belluno 0,74 0,66 0,07
Catanzaro 1,28 0,941 0,34
Como 0,66 0,596 0,06
Cuneo 0,82 0,736 0,08
Frosinone 1,26 0,902 0,36
Genova 0,32 0,298 0,02
Gorizia 1,14 0,641 0,49
La Spezia 0,68 0,596 0,08
L’Aquila 1,2 0,906 0,29
Lecce 1,2 0,909 0,29
Lucca 0,72 0,662 0,058
Monza 0,5 0,471 0,029
Palermo 0,96 0,823 0,13
Parma 0,4 0,447 -0,047
Piacenza 0,54 0,578 -0,038
Pistoia 0,6 0,52 0,08
Rieti 1,2 0,883 0,317
Taranto 0,92 0,824 0,096
Verona 0,52 0,499 0,021
Average 0,13
Median 0,08
Std. Dev. 0,15
Min -0,047
Max 0,49
Table 17: Double preference vote rate
Notes: The table presents the preference indices for 2012 and 2017. The preference
index is calculated as the votes given by voters compared to the maximum available
number of votes. The double preference vote index is achieved by subtraction, and
has to be multiplied by two to arrive at the share of voters who used the second
preference vote.
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8.1 How would uninformed voters vote, when given information?
Results from the electoral survey indicate that a large share of voters appear to be
not to be using the second preference vote: according to the electoral survey, only
around one third of voters use the second preference. Of voters who were unaware of
the opportunity to cast two preference votes in their municipality, 47.9% perceived
equal gender representation in their municipality council as very important (5 on
a scale of 5). Voters might then not use the second vote not because of strategic
concerns or an ”expressive” opposition to the policy, but simply because they are
not aware of its existence.
The voters who would be likely to use the second preference vote if informed are the
ones who, in the pre-electoral survey, indicated two candidates of di↵erent gender
as their first and second preferred candidates. In addition, the region of the voter
influences propensity to place preference votes, with Southern Italian voters placing
placing on average more preference votes. Finally, the gender of the voter could
influence the propensity to vote for a candidate of the same gender or to place a
second preference vote. Voter behavior with information can be simulated by re-
gressing the number of overall votes, the number of votes for female candidates and
the number of votes for male candidates on these characteristics for the group of
informed voters, and then extending the results to the overall pool of voters partic-
ipating in the survey through a linear prediction.
The electoral survey data indicates that 38% of the votes placed by participants
are directed at female candidates, although there are di↵erences between informed
and uninformed voters. Of the overall votes placed by informed voters (N=343),
around 41% are directed to female candidates. This figure includes both first pref-
erence votes and second preference votes. Of these informed voters, 38% use the
second preference vote. The figure for uninformed voters is lower: 33.5% vote for
female candidates.
Predicting the voter behavior of voters who are uninformed based on behavior of in-
formed voters (with a similar approach to Kendall et al. (2015)) would indicate that,
if the uninformed voters would be given information, the share of votes received by
female candidates would increase from the current 38% to 43%. Also the number of
votes per voter would increase to 1.02 votes per voter on average compared to the
0.83 votes per voter estimated from answers collected in the survey. This increase
in votes per voter would would mean additional 2 out of 10 voters would start using
the second preference vote, when informed about the policy.
58
9 Discussion
9.1 The policy’s impact on the share of women elected, turnout,
and quality of politicians
The policy has increased the number of female politicians in municipal council by
13.4 p.p., meaning it has added one to two additional female politicians for the
average size of the council at the 5000 municipality threshold (11 councilors). The
result is consistent with Baltrunaite et al. (2017), although the e↵ect is smaller when
extending the sample to include all municipalities (18.3 percentage points vs. 13.4
percentage points). The smaller impact of the policy estimated from the full set of
municipalities can be attributed to the smaller e↵ect the policy has had in munic-
ipalities using it for the second time, where the e↵ect has been very small due to
an increase in women elected in municipalities below the threshold. The regression
plots for each year between 2013 and 2018 support this insight, and are available in
the appendix, Figure 15.
Equal representation of women in political organs is especially relevant because
it might impact policymaking at the municipal level, especially in the areas that
are more likely to provide advantages to women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).
(Baltrunaite et al., 2017). The new voting system might then contribute to creating
local policies favoring women living in these municipalities. Increased represen-
tation is reflected in policymaking e↵ectively if the newly elected politicians are
able to fully participate in the decision making process. While municipal council-
lors receive permits enabling them to attend council meetings during o ce hours,
competing childcare duties, in case they are allocated to women, might create an
obstacle to participation in evening sessions, where often the most important top-
ics are discussed. 9 Inability to fully participate in these political activities might
prevent elected women from influencing policy outcomes through participation and
from advancing in the political career. It could also deter qualified candidates from
running for o ce. At the same time, increased exposure to female politicians may
create positive spillovers for future candidates (Baskaran and Hessami, 2018): for
example, observing municipalities that have voted twice through the policy, one
could hypothesise that the policy has created spillovers below the 5000 municipality
threshold, where female councillors have increased since the previous elections in
2013, when the policy was first adopted. While the impact on councilors has been
overall significant (around one and up to two more female councillors per council at
the threshold, for councils of 11 members approximately), this increased representa-
tion has not a↵ected the presence of women in leadership positions: the policy did
not have a significant causal e↵ect on the increase in the share of female mayors in
municipalities a↵ected.
9This insight on the timing of municipal council meetings was provided in an interview to Pietro
Petruzzelli, a council member in Bari, Italy.
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Double preference voting associated with gender quotas in party lists did not have
a significant impact on the quality of politicians measured as years of education in
municipalities where the policy was introduced, although the e↵ect is more likely to
have been positive based on its confidence interval. The estimated coe cient would
indicate an increase in around 3 months of education, although graphical inspection
reveals that education levels seem to be increasing with population size, with no
clear cuto↵ at the 5000 inhabitants threshold. A previous study from Baltrunaite
et al. (2014) showed that gender quotas raised the quality of politicians increasing
the average level of education of councillors by 0.12 to 0.24 years - corresponding to
around one to two months of additional education on average. The e↵ect was related
to an increase in the quality of elected male politicians, who were not subjected to
the policy. In terms of selection of politicians to the municipal council, the result
suggests that the increased competition within parties did not lead higher quality
candidates to be elected. Since quality is measured through years of education, it is
still possible that the policy has increased the quality of candidates based on some
other unobserved dimension.
A prominent new characteristic of the voting system is the opportunity of voters
to vote for a certain composition of the municipal council, instead of single candi-
dates. While increasing the complexity of the voting decision, this opportunity also
might increase the expressive utility voters derive from voting as they can vote for
their preferred level of diversity in addition to the single candidates’ characteristics.
The potential of the policy to increase diversity in the composition of municipal
councils could have elicited more voters to go to the polls in municipalities where it
was adopted, increasing turnout. On the other hand, it might also have decreased
turnout, if voters disagree with the mechanism of the policy or perceive it as co-
ercive. Regression estimates are imprecise: at most, the policy might have had a
positive impact of 2.5% or it could have decreased turnout by 4%. In addition to
overall turnout, the turnout for male and female voters is also available from the
Ministry of Foreign A↵airs website. The intervals for male and female voters are
similar to the ones estimated for the overall electorate, and significant e↵ects on
male or female turnout can thus not be detected, either.
9.2 Uninformed voters and the design of the ballot
One of the main results from the electoral survey concerns the unawareness of vot-
ers concerning the new voting system (47% of participants). Second, even when the
availability of two votes is clear, voters participating in the electoral survey were not
able to identify the ballots in which votes would be deemed valid in the vote count:
voters seem to only be poorly able to anticipate the e↵ect of their vote on the final
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Figure 13: Identification of valid ballots
Notes: The figure shows the share of participants in the survey who selected di↵erent
ballots as valid: each column represents one type of ballot selected. The only correct
ballot was the first, but many voters selected both the first and other ballots as valid,
making the response incorrect even if they had selected the correct ballot besides
other ballots.
result of the election, even when they use two preferences. For example, the use of
the disjoint vote is unclear to many voters: whereas the electoral rule establishes
that the two preference votes shall be given within the same party list, 35% of partic-
ipants selected a ballot with two candidates in di↵erent lists as ”Valid”. Interviews
with local politicians participating in the elections in 2017 confirmed this finding10.
Results are shown in Figure 11. The ability to indicate the correct number of votes
was not correlated with gender or education for participants of the survey.
Lack of understanding on behalf of voters might be partly related to the mis-
leading design of the ballot associated with a lack of prompting at the electoral site
on the correct voting rule. In the current electoral ballot, there is no indication of
the availability of the second preference vote. An example of an alternative configu-
ration of the ballot is presented in Figure 13. As voters in Italy can place their vote
by writing the name and surname of the candidate, the second line might be mis-
taken as a space to write the surname of the candidate. There might be reluctance
to add additional indication of the order of candidates if policymakers suspect the
vote can be better ”controlled” in this way. The better opportunity to control the
10Leonora Rossi, a local politician in Pisa who participated in the 2018 elections, mentioned the
use of the disjoint vote as one of the most common problems encountered by the vote counting
committee
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use of votes through the order or couples was one of the common critiques to the
adoption of the policy in the first hand.11
The concerns for vote control can be however alleviated if the ballot does not have
numbers for candidates but instead ”boxes” where the names can be inserted, or
again if two ballots for candidates of each gender are made available to the voter.
The latter method would also limit the opportunity to associated the voted pair to
a single voter; however, it could increase problems relative to the use of the disjoint
vote. For example Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), although in a di↵erent context,
propose that the design of the ballot in Spanish Senate elections might have con-
tributed to the ine ciency of quotas on party lists, as parties exploited positioning
of candidates to put female candidates at disadvantage.
Figure 14: Alternative configuration of the ballot
9.3 Limitations
While the study presents many interesting insights concerning the working of this
policy, certain aspects have to be generalized with caution. First, results from
the impact evaluation of the policy (regression discontinuity) are complementary
to the results of the electoral survey; they do not concern the same municipalities
and therefore they should not be compared. While the impact evaluation munic-
ipalities are municipalities below the 15,000 inhabitant threshold, the majority of
participants to the survey are from a set of large municipalities (more than 15,000
inhabitants). The impact estimated through the regression discontinuity design is
local, at the 5000 inhabitants threshold, whereas data on the use of double pref-
erence votes, knowledge of voters of the voting system and ordering of preference
votes for male and female candidates are estimated from larger municipalities that
are thus further away from this threshold.
11For example, the following popular writing articles raise concerns on double preference voting
as an instrument potentially used by organized crime to manipulate voting behavior: La Voce,
InGenere.
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The survey methodology used also might limit the external validity of results.
Although on certain basic characteristics the survey participants did not seem to
greatly di↵er from the population of the municipalities voting on average, they might
di↵er on other unobserved characteristics or they might have misreported their char-
acteristics during the panel registration. The survey was distributed first four days
before the elections and a week after the elections had taken place. Because of
the lack of direct monetary incentives in the survey, it might be that participants
have at time randomized their responses or that some di↵erent type of selection
has occurred when participants had to decide whether to participate in the survey.
The presence of individuals randomizing their answers should a↵ect the precision
through which the real e↵ects can be detected, although it should not change the
consistency of the answers with respect to the population covered by the survey.
The total panel of participants recruited by the company has around 10,000 par-
ticipants, which indicated that the response rate for the survey was among 10% of
these potential panelists.
10 Conclusion
This work investigates the mechanism and impact of a new policy, implemented in
Italy in 2013: double preference voting conditioned on gender. The new policy in-
troduced a second vote available to voters to choose a candidate of a gender di↵erent
from their first preferred candidate. The availability of a second vote conditioned
on gender, if fully exploited by voters without errors, should lead to an equal dis-
tribution of votes to female and male candidates. The impact of this new policy
was first investigated by Baltrunaite et al. (2017), who found that it increased votes
received by women by 18 p.p. from around 18% to 36%. Using results from new
elections covering also years 2016-2018 and thus, all voting municipalities includ-
ing some municipalities that voted twice. Using a regression discontinuity design
evaluating the impact of the policy at the 5000 population cuto↵, I find that the
new policy has increased votes for women slightly less than previously expected, 13
percentage points instead of 18 when accounting for all municipalities available.
The increase in votes received by women achieved by the policy is, however, still
modest compared to its potential. Why has the increase in votes for women has
then been so moderate? A rational ignorance viewpoint applied to candidate choice
would lead us to believe that voters do not see the benefit of acquiring additional
information to choose a second candidate, as the political relevance of a single mu-
nicipal councilor is, in any case, limited. Results from the survey indicate that only
around 28% of voters exploit the second preference vote available to them and that,
of the overall survey population 47% are not aware that the second preference vote
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exists in their municipality. The results from the survey are also supported by the
estimated ”double preference vote index” which shows that only around one third of
voters started using the second preference vote when it was made available to them.
It is probable that ignorance of the voting policy contributes to the low share of
voters using the second preference vote: women participating in the survey or more
educated participants did not use more second preference votes than other survey
participants.
Why are voters, then, unaware of the new policy? There are three concomitant
factors that can contribute to explain the phenomenon. First, the rational igno-
rance perspective can also be applied to the understanding of the attitude towards
the overall vote: the limited importance of municipal councilors compared to the
mayor might lead voters to neglect acquiring additional information on the elec-
toral system for municipal councilors. Second, the widespread ignorance suggests
also that parties might have not actively promoted the existence of the policy. In
fact, the new system increases competition within parties for a limited amount of
seats. This type of obfuscation might be convenient for party members, if candidates
presently getting elected at the margin are subject to a higher amount of compe-
tition as a result of the policy and thus risk not getting a place in the municipal
council as a consequence.
Third, on a more practical level, the lack of prompting at the electoral stage, joint
with the misleading design of the electoral ballot can contribute to the persistence
of this ignorance. In this regard, the electoral ballot’s design does not clearly indi-
cate that two candidates can be chosen - the elector can mistake the two lines to
indicate the space for name and surname of the candidate, instead of indicating two
candidates.
If all voters were aware of the existence of the two votes, then votes received by
women candidates would increase from 38% to 43% overall. Among unaware voters,
votes received by women would rise from 33.5% to 44%. Even if certain voters might
still decide not to use the second vote, more of the potential of the policy would be
exploited if voters were aware of the availability of two votes. On a practical level,
the use of the two votes can perhaps be increased by indicating on the electoral
ballot that two votes are available, for candidates of di↵erent gender. If the order-
ing of preference votes or additional information raises concerns of ”vote control”
in locations where this has historically been problematic, the use of separate ballots
for male and female candidates could also be an option.
The less than optimal use of the policy o↵ers opportunities for future research.
The increase in use of preference votes from one election to the other does not
suggest radical increases in awareness concerning the policy on behalf of voters in
a↵ected municipalities. While voters might acquire information on the existence of
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the policy over time and therefore the policy can, in some years, achieve its poten-
tial in terms of votes received by women, the current setting o↵ers opportunities to
study the reasons why female candidates do not attract votes: is the lack of votes
related to simple lack of information on the existence of the policy, and what would
be the e↵ect of informing them? A potential avenue for future research would be
the observation of the impact of an informational intervention with di↵erent treat-
ments: one where the information concerns only the existence of the policy, others
advertising the lack of women in certain municipal councils. Voters participating
in the survey deemed equal representation important, therefore, linking information
on the availability of the policy with its expected impact could have a greater e↵ect
on the use of second votes.
There exist a few examples of informational interventions through randomized con-
trolled trials in the literature. The closest study to the proposed intervention is
Kendall et al. (2015). In this paper, authors use a large-scale randomized field
experiment to evaluate the impact of di↵erent types of information on mayoral elec-
tions in Italy. They operate within an electorate, randomizing their treatments at
the electoral precinct level, with the objective to observe the impact of two types of
promotional campaigns on both survey results and vote shares. They employ two
treatments. The first is based on the ”valence” of the mayor (the mayor’s compe-
tence, e ciency) and the other based on the mayor’s ideology (keywords used refer
to the mayor’s values, such as ”solidarity”). Their results show that the valence
message was more e↵ective in eliciting votes for the candidate. In the context of
double preference voting, the two treatments would imply a similar setting: the first
one would only refer to the availability of the policy, prompting voters to use the
second vote as it is available to them; whereas the second would have an ideological
connotation, appealing to voters concerned with equality. Based on the results from
Kendall et al. (2015), the expectation of the e↵ect on shares of votes of these two
treatments would be that the more neutral provision of information would elicit a
larger increase in the use of double preference votes. However, since the treatment
including the information and ideology would be incremental compared to pure in-
formation, it would depend on the placed importance on equality on behalf of voters
whether the impact would be larger or smaller.
Many of the informational field experiments performed are aimed at increasing
turnout in elections, especially in the United States (”Get out the vote” studies).
Aiming at increasing the number of preference votes by promoting the use of double
preference voting can be compared to aiming at an increase in turnout, even if it
concerns only the use of additional preference votes. In both cases, an increase in
turnout and an increase in double preference votes enlarge the pool of votes from
which a decision is taken. Use of a larger share of preference votes might also create
a more representative council in a diversity dimension: by using double preference
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votes, informed voters can decide the level of diversity they want to achieve in their
municipality by ”voting for” a certain share of female and male candidates in the
council. The studies belonging to this stream of the literature mostly aim at evalu-
ating the impact of di↵erent channels of communication on turnout of voters. For
example, some of these studies observe the di↵erent impact of telephone calls or
canvassing on electoral outcomes (Gerber and Green, 2000). Besides techniques for
information distribution, the impact of di↵erent types of ideological information has
been also studied in the United States. Gerber et al. (2009) looks at the influence
of di↵erent types of media on votes received by parties. The researchers conduct
a randomized controlled experiment where they distribute newspapers with a left-
or right-wing ideology to di↵erent electoral districts and observe their impact on
votes. Similarly to Kendall et al. (2015), they find that ”pure information” (receiv-
ing any of the two newspapers) is more e↵ective than ideology: the share of votes
for the democratic party increased in the treated electoral districts independent of
them receiving the democratic newspaper or not - information was more e↵ective
in impacting political outcomes compared to ideology. While most informational
interventions have focused on the e↵ect of information on turnout, some recent ex-
periments shifted their attention on the e↵ect of information shares of votes and
their persistence, as Pons (2018): in field experiment conducted during political
elections in France in 2012, door-to-door campaigning increased the share of votes
of the presidential candidate Hollande, with persistent e↵ects on the electorate also
after the election in 2012. This persistence suggests that at best, the informational
intervention could have a lasting impact on women’s representation in municipal
councils in Italy. Acquisition of information on behalf of the electorate alone seems
to have been slow based on an estimation performed by comparing votes per voter
in 2013 and 2018.
Within the literature evaluating the impact of informational interventions, special
attention has been placed to the impact of social pressure on electoral outcomes:
Gerber et al. (2008) uses a large scale field experiment to show that promising to
advertise the turnout in certain electoral districts publicly increases turnout for the
districts whose results will be advertised. A similar positive impact on turnout is
observed in DellaVigna et al. (2016), who finds that voters are motivated to go to
the polls if they have to report it to others afterwards. This ”social pressure” aspect
studied in the literature could also be included in the intervention by comparing the
share of votes received by women in certain electoral districts compared to others,
based on the use of double preference votes and share of votes received by women
in these sections in previous elections.
Finally, laboratory experiments have also been used to determine the impact of
the information level of voters on electoral and policy outcomes, with attention
placed on the extent to which voters can anticipate the e↵ect of their vote. For
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example Lupia (1994) uses a series of laboratory experiments in a setting of simu-
lated direct democracy to evaluate the impact of the level of information on policy
outcomes chosen by voters. In these experiments, the probability of voters casting a
correct vote based on their interests depends on the level of information they have.
The study also shows that in cases where most voters are uninformed the electoral
outcome is determined by the informed voters who can strategically anticipate how
other voters will behave. In the context of double preference voting, the current
share of votes received by women also reflects the preferences of the informed part
of the electorate, even though many of the uninformed voters may have deemed
equal representation as important in the electoral survey. Increasing information
on the availability of the policy might then also impact the representativeness of
the elected administration, especially for what concerns the electorate’s diversity
preferences.
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Appendix
Electoral surveys
Pre-electoral survey
The pre-electoral survey was conducted during the four days leading up to the elec-
tion (from Thursday to Saturday, when the elections were held on the 10th of June,
2018). Information was collected anonymously. The link was available only once
for each participants and thus it was not possible to reselect options following a
strategy to participate in the survey. There was no indication on the content of the
survey before answering the question concerning the municipality of residence. Par-
ticipants to the survey were invited to participate through an online link provided
by the company. Participants were selected form a pool of candidates, of around
10.000, collected in person by the company.
The survey consisted of six questions, for an estimated time of answering of 3-4
minutes per participant.
Qualifying questions
• In which municipality do you reside?
Available answers: all municipalities and provinces. The respondent was redi-
rected to the actual survey only in case he selected one of the municipalities
voting in the June 2018 elections.
Intention to vote and information
The original language of the questionnaire is Italian. The questions in the survey
are translated as follows:
• Do you plan on voting in the next administrative elections on June 10, 2018?
Available answers: ”Yes”, ”No”, ”I am not sure” with the possibility to mark
only one option.
• How informed do you feel concerning the candidates running for the municipal
council in your municipality?
Available answers: 1-5 Likert scale, with option 1 representing ”Not informed
at all” and option 5 of the scale representing option ”Very informed”.
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Preferred list and candidates
• Which list do you prefer, of the ones presented in your municipality?
Available answers: list of the party lists presented in the municipality of choice.
Respondent can select one option among these.
• Who is your preferred candidate among those presented by your preferred list?
Available answers: A list of candidates presented in the list. Only one op-
tion can be selected.
• If you had a chance to choose also a second candidate from your list, which
candidate would you choose?
Available answers: A list of candidates presented in the list, except the can-
didate selected at the previous question. Only one option can be selected.
• Which candidates do you know personally, of the ones presented from your
preferred list?
Available answers: A list of candidates presented in the list. Multiple options
can be selected.
Post-electoral survey
The post-electoral survey was administered around ten days after the election day.
The participants to this survey were selected among the participants to the first
survey who were successfully recontacted. 720 people were successfully recontacted
to participate to this survey.
Qualifying questions
• Did you vote during the 10 June 2018 municipal elections?
Available answers: Yes / No. If the participant selected No, then he was
automatically discarded from the questionnaire and his answers were not col-
lected.
Understanding of the voting system
• How many preference votes were available in your municipality during the 10
June 2018 elections?
Available answers, with possible selection of at most one answer choice, were
72
the following: ”One (1) preference”; ”Two (2) preferences”; Three (3) prefer-
ences”; ”No preferences at all”.
• Now, consider the voting rule employed at current in your municipality. Con-
sider carefully the di↵erent filled-in ballots proposed below in the figures.
Which of these ballots would be considered valid, based on the existing voting
rule in your municipality?
Available answers: In this question, multiple answer choices were possible.
The voter was presented with pictures of ballots with di↵erent vote combi-
nations (example in figure below). The first option marked under list 1 two
preference votes: one for a male candidate and one for a female candidate.
This was the correct ballot. Secondly, a ballot with two female candidates
of the same list was presented. Third, a ballot with two male candidates of
the same list was presented. Finally, a ballot with two candidates of di↵erent
lists and di↵erent genders was presented. The only ballot conforming to the
electoral rule (and thus, which in elections would have been considered in i†s
entirety) was the first ballot. Thus, selecting only the first option would have
been the only correct choice for this question.
Use of preference votes
• Which list did you vote for in the June 10 2018 elections of your municipality?
Available answers: A list of presented candidate lists in the municipality of
choice. Only one answer choice possible.
• How many preference votes did you use?
Available answers: ”One (1) preference”; ”Two(2) preferences”; ”I voted only
for my preferred list”.
• For which candidates did you use your preference vote within your preferred
list?
Available answers: A list of candidates was presented for choices. The number
of available choices depended on the number of preferences used, based on the
answer to the previous question.
• In case the participant expressed no preference votes: Why did you not use
any preference votes?
Available answers: ”I am not interested in municipal elections”, ” I did not
have enough information about candidates” ”I had information about candi-
dates, but none of them caught my attention specifically” ”Other (specify)”.
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• In case the participant only expressed one vote: Why did you use only one
preference vote?
Available answers: ”I did not have enough information about additional can-
didates” ”I did not like any additional candidate of a di↵erent gender than the
first” ”I do not agree with the principle of double preference voting” ”Other
(specify)”
• In case the participant expressed two votes: Why did you choose to employ
the double vote of preference?
Available answers: ”I voted for my two favorite candidates”; ”I want to in-
crease the share of elected women in my municipal council”; ”The candidates
I voted for campaigned together for the elections”; ”I want another candidate
of the list NOT to be elected”; ”Other (specify)”.
Perception of the voting system
The participant is asked to express her degree of agreement with the statements
proposed.
• How important is it for you that women are equally represented in your mu-
nicipal council?
Available answers: Likert scale 1-5, with option ”1” meaning ”Not important
at all” and option 5 meaning ”Very important”.
• Double preference voting is an e cient method to empower women in politics.
Available answers: Likert scale 1-5, with option ”1” meaning ”Not in agree-
ment” and option 5 meaning ”Strongly agree”.
• Double preference voting is not an e cient method to empower women in pol-
itics, because it does not influence the choice of mayor in the municipality.
Available answers: Likert scale 1-5, with option ”1” meaning ”Not in agree-
ment” and option 5 meaning ”Strongly agree”.
• Double preference voting limits the voter’s freedom of choice.
Available answers: Likert scale 1-5, with option ”1” meaning ”Not in agree-
ment” and option 5 meaning ”Strongly agree”.
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Additional regression discontinuity plots
Share of elected women
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Figure 15: Share of women councilors pre-reform
Notes: The graph plots the binned average of the share of women councilors before
the implementation of the reform (before 2012) against the municipality size in pop-
ulation above and below the 5,000 inhabitants threshold. The black line represents
the fitted line from a second-order polynomial. The figure contains municipalities
with up to 10,000 inhabitants.
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Figure 16: Share of female councilors 2013-2018
Notes: The graph plots the binned average of the share of women councilors before
the implementation of the reform (before 2012) against the municipality size in pop-
ulation above and below the 5,000 inhabitants threshold. The black line represents
the fitted line from a second-order polynomial. The figure contains municipalities
with up to 10,000 inhabitants.
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Impact of the policy on educational attainment of elected candidates
Figure 17: Education of councilors, pre- and post-reform
Notes: The graph represents the average level of educational attainment of munic-
ipal councilors in councils, measured in years of education completed. The figure
represents the average level for councilors elected after and before the reform for
municipalities up to 15000 inhabitants.
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Impact of the policy on turnout
Figure 18: Turnout in elections 2016 and 2017, by gender
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Impact of the policy on female mayors
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Figure 19: Women mayors before the reform
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Electoral Survey
Figure 20: Survey participants by size of their municipality
Notes: The graph shows the relative shares of survey participants belonging to a
class of municipalities, by size. Most survey participant belong to municipality that
has between 30,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 21: Educational attainment of survey participants
Notes: The graph shows the share of respondents to the electoral survey who have
completed a college degree of the total number of survey participants. The data is
based on the profile information of survey participants.
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Figure 22: Age distribution
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of age of respondents to the electoral
survey. The data is based on the profile information of survey participants.
Figure 23: Gender of participants
Notes: The graph shows the gender of participants to the electoral survey.
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Figure 24: Marital status of survey participants
Figure 25: Household size of survey participants
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Figure 26: Income class of participants
Notes: The graph shows the share of respondents to the electoral survey who belong
to each income class. Most survey participants earn between 12.000 and 28.000 euros
per year according to the personal information recorded in the survey provider’s
database.
Figure 27: Occupation of participants, by type
Notes: The graph shows the share of respondents to the electoral survey who belong
to each occupation class. Most survey participants were full-time workers.
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Perception of the voting system
How important is it to you that women are equally represented
in your municipal council?
Notes: The graph shows the share of voters who gave a particular score in the Likert scale to the statement.
A Likert score of 1 means that the voter finds equal representation unimportant, a score of 5 expresses the
voters’ highest support for the statement.
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”Double preference voting is an e cient tool to empower women in politics”
Notes: The graph shows the share of voters who gave a particular score in the Likert scale to the statement.
A Likert score of 1 means that the voter completely disagrees with the statement, a score of 5 expresses the
voters’ highest agreement with the statement.
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”Double preference voting is not an e cient tool to empower women in
politics because it does not a↵ect the choice of mayor”
Notes: The graph shows the share of voters who gave a particular score in the Likert scale to the statement.
A Likert score of 1 means that the voter disagrees with the statement, a score of 5 expresses the voters’
highest agreement with the statement.
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”Double preference voting limits the freedom of choice of the voters”
Notes: The graph shows the share of voters who gave a particular score in the Likert scale to the statement.
A Likert score of 1 means that the voter completely disagrees with the statement, a score of 5 expresses the
voters’ highest agreement with the statement.
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